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I. A STRATEGIC PLANNING MODEL
Strategic planning is essentially a management function
that requires intellect as well as imagination. Strategic
planners should be concerned with identifying interests,
visualizing future scenarios and evaluating alternative ways
and means of achieving desired goals. Central to this process
should be long term analysis aimed at efficient stewardship
of this nation's finite resources.
Strategic relationships, however, are "as much psycho-
logical as physical: weapons may finally settle the account
but their triggering is the result of the strategies and
tactics, myths and logic, fears and hopes, mistakes and
talent, and perceptions and misperceptions which exist in
the minds of men.'
Glenn Snyder defined rationality as "choosing to act in
a manner which gives best promise of maximizing one's value
position on the basis of sober calculation of potential
2
gains and losses, and probabilities of enemy actions."
His definition implies several decision-making characteristics,
namely, that all possible alternatives must be considered,
that the alternatives are considered on their merits, that
Kenneth Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism , London: Croom
Helm Ltd. , 1979
, p. 101.
2Glenn Synder, Deterrence and Defense , Princeton:




calculations are based on accurate information and that
decisions will be made based on logic not emotion. Where
the danger lies, is the impact of cultural biasing on the
decision making process.
While strategic thought is a universal preoccupation,
its result, strategy, is always contextual, reflecting
cultural biased perceptions, interests, traditions, and
ideologies. Calculations of rational behavior are culturally
dependent in two ways. First, one nation's cultural heritage
may prevent its decision-makers from seeing certain options
which might be rational in an objective sense. A good
example of this is the Kamikaze pilot of World War II. It
is highly unlikely that a group of Western planners would
even consider such tactics as an acceptable method of
stopping enemy warships, although Japanese planners felt
the tactic fit their criteria of rationality. Secondly,
culture is important because it shapes the ends which create
the problem to which rational thinking has to be addressed.
If an outsider cannot understand the reasonableness of a
particular end, he probably is not going to appreciate the
rationality of the means. An example of this is the reaction
of the Western military establishment to the Soviet
institution of the military commissar.
The net impact of cultural biasing, ethnocentrism, is
distortion at all stages of the decision-making process,
Booth, p. 64

from the gathering and screening of information to the discussion
of what is likely to constitute the best (most rational) course
of action. Cultural relativism, an effort to perceive and
describe social and cultural phenomena in terms of scientific
detachment, is the key by which a strategic planner can move
from a psychological milieu into the operational milieu.
The utility of a planning model lies in its ability to
provide a conceptual framework around which a planner can
organize his analysis. Confronting the analysts, are two
types of planning, long term vs. short term. The two should
not be confused, nor conducted at the same level of analysis.
Short term planning generally involves instrumental goals.
Foreign policy objectives/interests are stated confidently
and the environment can be described with sufficient certainty
to provide the foundations for a rational strategy. At this
level of analysis, the area specialist reigns supreme because
of the need for expertise in a specific area. The "big picture"
however, is often lost under the pressures of day to day
decision making. Short term planning is usually characterized
by a limited capability to sense conditions beyond the
immediate issue.
Long-range planning should be conducted at the macrolevel
by strategic planners. The process should: (1) deal with
broad terminal goals vice specific interests? (2) conceptualize
a preferred long-range environment; (3) enunciate policies
to assure the attainment of the preferred environment and;
10

(4) develop an integrated coherent strategy composed of core,
forward-looking, and hedging substrategies
. A premium should be



















The term "national interests" represents an effort to
understand the underlying rationale for the behavior of states
on the international scene. Proponents of the concept view
it as the key to an understanding of what motivates a state's
actions, while critics advance the position that the concept
is too broad, too vague, or too ill defined to be useful as
an analytical tool. The position of this author is that once
the national interests in a particular region are identified
and categorized, they can serve as a focus around which the
complex and diverse issues of U.S. foreign policy can be
organized.
Donald Neuchterlein, in his book, National Interests and
Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities , presented
a conceptual framework that categorizes U.S. national
interests into four areas:
11

1. Defense of the homeland: this interest deals with
the defense of the continental United States and the strategic
balance of power between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Issues would include SALT, violations of Canadian
air space and security interests in the Caribbean basin.
2. Economic well-being: this interest deals with a wide
range of international economic issues which affect the
American standard of living. Issues would include the value
of the dollar, the price of gold, the ability of American
firms to trade and invest overseas, the impact of international
cartels and access to foreign sources of oil and minerals.
3. Favorable world order: this interest deals with
international security arrangements. Issues would include
U.S. security agreements with countries outside of North
America, regional balance of power calculations, wars of
national liberation, wars between non-communist countries
and access to foreign bases.
4. Promotion of values: this interest deals with the
question of ideology as a basis of American foreign policy.
Issues would include implementation of the Helsinki Accords,
pressure on South Africa to alter its repressive racial
policies and pressure on authoritarian allies to lessen
human rights violations.
Identification of which types of interest would represent
only the first step in an assessment of U.S. national
interests in a region. Step two would involve assessing
12

the intensity of those interests with respect to overall
U.S. interests. The categories Nuechterlein utilized in
his matrix will be used here:
1. Survival issues: the very existence of the state is
in jeopardy either as a result of an overt military attack
or the threat of an attack if demands are rejected.
2. Vital issues: serious harm will likely result to
the state unless strong measures, including the use of
conventional military forces, are employed to counter and
adverse action taken by another state or to deter it from
undertaking a serious provocation.
3. Major issues: a state's political, economic, or
ideological well being may be adversely affected by events
or trends in the international environment, requires actions
aimed at preventing them from becoming serious threats (vital
issues) . Most issues in international relations fall into
this category and are resolved through diplomatic negotiations
4. Peripheral issues: a state's well being is not
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but the
interest of its private citizens or its companies operating
abroad may be endangered.
The final phase in the assessment of national interests
is to identify where tradeoffs exist between interests.
Traditionally, U.S. efforts to realize defense and world-
order interests have run counter to U.S. efforts to achieve
economic or ideological interests. Current U . S ./Japanese
13

relations exemplify the tradeoffs between economic and world
order interests.
With short range planning, interests can be stated
confidently and the environment can be described with
sufficient accuracy to provide the basis for a sound strategy
With long term planning uncertainty undermines the confidence
a planner has in his ability to forecast future interest
and future environments. With an interest, the problem
can be solved by stating the interest at a sufficiently
high level of generality. Access to resources in Southern
Africa will likely remain an issue over the long term, while
access to Rhodesian chrome or Zairean cobalt may not.
The solution to the problem of portraying the environment
over the long term is to develope a range of probable
alternative environments. The spectrum of scenarios should
be narrow enough to be intellectually manageable, while
wide enough to encompass most of the likely variations. The
spectrum should reflect present trends not wishful thinking
or the use of unrealistic alternatives.
The end objective of long range strategic planning is
a strategy capable of generating a set of recommendations to
the decision maker. To accomplish this in a dynamic and




1. A core strategy - aimed at achieving our interest,
irrespective of changing environments. Recognizes that
certain policies remain constant over time.
2. A forward looking strategy - aimed at achieving a
favorable environment in the target area. Recognizes that
U.S. policy decisions can have significant impact on future
events
.
3. A nedging strategy - aimed at handling unforseen
contingencies/surprises. Recognizes that many events are
beyond the control of the U.S. and that there are surprises
in store for long range planners.
Cultural relativity figures prominently in the planning
process in three ways. First, in order to forecast future
trends in a country, a planner has to understand the forces
at work within that society. He has to be able to identify
the major actors and determine their objectives. Second,
to devise an effective strategy, the planner must know what
motivates the major actors. Once this is determined, the
planner can then devise a strategy aimed at promoting U.S.
interests. Third, U.S. foreign policy operates in a dynamic
world. Policy options have to constantly be revised to
reflect changes in the operational milieu.
L5

II. U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
In 1969, the National Security Council adopted the second
in a list of five alternative options presented as a basis
of U.S. foreign policy in Southern Africa. Option Number Two
argued that American national interests would best be served
"by compensating for, rather than abandoning, tangible U.S.
interests in White states". By turning the sights of Black
states away from the total liberation of the continent, the
U.S. would be free to realize its economic and strategic
interests throughout the region. This chapter will address
the question of U.S. interests in Southern Africa.
U.S. national interests in South Africa fall into four
categories: defense; economic; world -order; and ideological.
At present, U.S. defense interests can be classified as
"peripheral" while our economic, world-order and ideological
are "major" in intensity.
A. DEFENSE INTERESTS
At present, the Republic of South Africa does not represent
a threat to the physical well-being of this nation or its
citizens. Given the disparity in resource bases and the
great distance involved it is highly probable that U.S. defense




U.S. economic interests in South Africa can be classified
as major. U.S. investment in South Africa is approximately
$3 billion, around 2 percent of U.S. world total, and U.S. /South
African trade is on the order of $6 billion a year. This
trade, representing less than 1 percent of U.S. totals, is
generally identified as the strongest U.S. interest in the
area.
1. Strategic Minerals
The case for South Africa ' s importance to the United
States and the West rests on its major position as a non-fuel
mineral producer. In 1982 South Africa was the fourth largest
producer of nonfuel minerals and accounted for more than half
the world's production of gold, platinum, diamonds and
vanadium and more than a third of its production of chrome,
managanese, aluminum, silicate, and vermiculite. Since the
largest single alternative source of gold, platinum, chrome,
manganese, and vanadium is the Soviet Union, the continued
access to South African supplies is crucial to Western
economies
.
Discussions of U.S. vulnerabilities are generally confined




Chromium is extracted from the ground as chromite
ore and is used principally in its iron-alloy form, ferrochrome.
17

When combined with nickel, ferrochrome produces stainless
steel. Because of stainless steel's high strength and its
ability to withstand heat and corrosion, it is critical in
the manufacture of jet engines, petrochemical and power
plant equipment and other products subjected to high pressure,
extreme temperature and/or corrosion. Chromium, in its
other forms, is used to produce other heat-resistant, high-
strength superalloys essential in defense, aviation, petro-
chemical, and power-generation industries.
While chromite occurs worldwide, the vast majority
of identified reserves are located in Southern Africa. The
world's largest known chromium resource is in the Bushveld
Complex, Transvaal, Republic of South Africa. South African
reserves have been estimated at over 2.5 billion tons of
high-iron chromite, with an additional identified subeconomic
4
resource in excess of 22 billion tons. The second largest
known deposits of chromite are in the Great Dyke Region of
Zimbabwe; estimated reserves are placed at 560 million tons
of high-chromium chromite and 56 million tons of high-iron
chromite.
The United States has some chromium ore deposits,
but none are economically exploitable at existing world prices.
4Bureau of Mines, Mineral Facts and Problems: 1980 Edition
,




In 1980, the United States imported 7 6 percent of its chromium
needs, both as ore and ferrochrome, from South Africa.
Europe and Japan relied on South African exports for 95
percent of their needs.
The South African government has encouraged on
site smelting of chromite. Since two and one-half tons of
chromite ore are required to produce one ton of ferrochrome,
this on site smelting reduces transportation costs by 30
percent and allows South Africa to under sell U.S. and
European processors. In 1980, South Africa's ferrochrome
capacity of 700,000 tons was more than double that of the
United States. 6
In the event of a short-term (up to five years)
cutoff of supplies from South Africa, the United States
would be able to continue to produce essential chromium
products. The U.S. stockpile includes a 2.3 year supply
of ferrochrome. America's other major sources of ore are
the Philippines, Turkey, the Soviet Union and Zimbabwe.
In response to a medium-term (five to ten years)
or a long-term (more than ten years) interruption, alternative
sources would have to be developed. New technologies aimed
at developing substitute materials and increased secondary
recovery efforts would be needed. It is estimated that a
Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, Sub-Sahara Africa:
Its Role in Critical Mineral Needs of the Western World ,"
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 17
7
Foreign Policy Study Foundation, South Africa: Time
Running Out
,




threefold increase in world chromium prices would make many
of the world's subeconomic resources profitable. This could
ease medium-term interruptions but long-term needs require
South Africa chromium or new steel-making technologies,
b. Manganese
Over 90 percent of all manganese consumption is
used in the production of iron and steel. In addition to
manganese's desulfurizing and deoxidizing properties, it is
an essential hardening and strengthening agent. Manganese's
other uses are the manufacture of dry-cell batteries and
in the production of various chemicals. At present, there
are no satisfactory substitutes for manganese.
At current prices, the United States has no
manganese resources that are economically exploitable.
Identified world reserves of manganese ore are about 1.5
billion tons with the Republic of South Africa and the
8Soviet Union accounting for 1.2 billion tons. Other major
alternative sources of manganese are Australia, Gabon, and
Brazil.
SAMANCOR, South African Manganese Corporation,
operates two mines in the Kalahari Field near Hotazel, South
Africa. These mines, an open pit and an underground mine,
account for 25 percent of the free world's manganese
production. The Mamatwan open pit mine is advancing at a
o
Bureau of Mines, p. 550.
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rate of 20 meters a year through a deposit that stretches
40 miles long, 5 miles wide and 70 feet thick. 9 To increase
production, the company has to only increase the number of
trucks in the pit. The South African Minerals Bureau
estimates potential resources in the area at 12.1 billion
tons or eight times the amount of presently identified
resources
.
In 1979 the United States imported 20 percent of
its manganese ore from South Africa, while Europe and Japan
relied on South African exports for 40 percent of their
needs. U.S. ferrmanganese imports reflected a 60 percent
reliance on South African sources, 44 percent directly and
16 percent from European processing of South African ore.
In the event of a short-term cutoff of manganese
from South Africa, the United States would be able to rely
on its stockpile (three years-ore and six months-ferroalloys)
,
private inventories and other sources of ore to lessen the
impact. Medium-term shortages might prove to be difficult
to deal with, unless countries like Australia, Brazil, Gabon,
and India were willing to expand their production. A long-
term source of manganese is the rich metal-bearing nodules
on the ocean floor.
Q
Bureau of Mines, p. 553.
Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 314
21

In the case of manganese, the major concern is
an adequate supply, not price, since manganese makes up only
1 to 2 percent of the cost of steel. Given the alternative
sources of manganese, the U.S. should be capable of
offsetting a loss in the supply of South African manganese,
c. Vanadium
Vanadium is used principally as an alloying
element in the manufacture of lightweight, high-strength
steels for jet engines, airframes, and oil/gas pipelines.
The Republic of South Africa accounts for over
35 percent of the vanadium produced in the world. The Highveld
Steel and Vanadium Corporation is the world's largest producer
of vanadium; marketing vanadium-bearing slag, vanadium
pentoxide, and ferrovanadium.
The United States is the third leading world
producer of vanadium after South Africa and the USSR.
Annually the United States produces more vanadium than it
uses. A total South African cutoff would leave worldwide
production almost 25 million pounds short of demand, a
shortage which could not be made up immediately by substitution
12
or by increased production in the United States. Thus
a cutoff in South African supplies would cause short-term
dislocations
.
Bureau of Mines, p. 1006.
12Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational




Medium to long term stoppages in South African
exports could be made up by increased production in the U.S.,
the USSR, Australia, Chile, Finland, India, Norway, and
Venezuela. Substitution would also be a possible alternative
since columbium, manganese, titanium, and tungsten can be
used almost interchangeably with vanadium in the manufacture
of certain steel alloys. Finally, since vanadium is primarily
a by-product of the mining of other ores, notably uranium
and secondary recovery from steel-making slag, production could
be increased in the United States and other uranium and
steel-producing countries.
d . Platinum-Group Metals
The uses of the platinum-group metals in modern
industry are related to their extraordinary catalytic
properties, their chemical inertness over wide temperature
ranges, and their high melting points.-'- In most applications,
it is a combination of two or more of these characteristics,
that makes the platinum-group metals uniquely useful.
Since 1975, platinum-palladium exhaust catalysts
have been used to reduce the emission of carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons from cars and trucks. Currently, this is
the single largest use of platinum-group metals in the United
States. Other uses include the manufacture of chemicals
and pharmaceuticals where they are used as catalysts and the
13Bureau of Mines, p. 685.
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production of corrosive resistant laboratory and processing
equipment.
South Africa and the Soviet Union are the world's
major producers of platinum-group metals. Each accounts for
47.5 percent of world production, the only other major
supplier is Canada which produces approximately 4 percent
of world demand. Canadian production is a by-product of
nickel mining.
The United States imports about 90 percent of
its consumption of platinum-group metals. Of this South
African exports account for 67 percent of U.S. imports.
Although U.S. reliance on South African platinum is high,
the possibility of secondary recovery is good. In the
event of a short-term cutoff, the United States could fill
the gap by recycling part of the 70 percent of platinum
consumption that is used for catalytic purposes. U.S.
stockpiles provide for only a four-month supply of platinum
itself, but stockpiles of substitutes are greater than a
one year supply.
U.S. resources of platinum could ease medium and
long term cutoffs in South African exports. Domestic reserves
are presently placed at 1 million troy ounces but if
exploration and feasibility studies prove that the deposits
in the Stillwater Complex, Montana and Duluth gabbro,
Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 317
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Minnesota, are economically exploitable, U.S. reserves would
top 300 million ounces. 15 This would provide the U.S. with
sufficient reserves to be self sufficient,
e. Gold
Since the 1950* s gold has emerged as an essential
industrial metal. Electronic computers utilize gold in
many parts of their electronic circuitry to insure reliable
operation. Gold shielding is utilized to protect against
radiation leaks and turbine blades in jet aircraft are
bonded to their rotors with high-performance gold brazing
alloys. As of 1980, over 27 percent of the gold consumed in
the United States went to industrial uses.
South Africa accounts for over 7 percent of gold
production in the non-communist world and holds more than 60
percent of the non-communist world's reserves. The West
Driefontein mine in Witwatersrand is the most profitable
gold mine the world has ever known. This mine alone produces
nearly twice the entire U.S. production. The next largest
gold producer is the USSR with 21 percent of world production
16followed by Canada with 4 percent and the U.S. with 2 percent.
Current supplies are more than adequate to meet
Western industrial demands. The traditional use of gold as
a monetary metal, however, holds open the possibility of
Bureau of Mines, p. 686.
16Bureauof Mines, p. 374.
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international monetary instability if South African supplies
were cut off. Even the prospect of a cut off would prompt
private investors and speculators to tie up large amounts
of capital in gold holdings. This would reduce the amount
of investment capital available in the West and contribute to
inflation by damaging the value of paper currencies.
2. U.S. Investments in South Africa
U.S. investment in South Africa is largely in the
manufacturing sector of the economy. In recent years
manufacturing has grown to 80 percent of total U.S. invest-
ment in South Africa. U.S. based multinationals have come
to view South Africa as a stable and profitable environment,
from which to expand their foothold in the vast potential
African market.
Some of the biggest U.S. manufacturing firms have
had plants in South Africa since the early 1900' s, but
recent expansion has resulted from South Africa's Nationalist
Government's efforts to spur industrialization. In 1978,
South Africa ranked fourteenth among all countries in the
world in terms of U.S. investment in manufacturing.
South Africa far outranks all the independent nations of
Africa, despite their strenuous efforts to attract U.S.
manufacturing companies.
There are several reasons for the rapid expansion of




relatively high incomes of the four million South African
whites provide a fairly large local market for multinational
goods. Second, the corporate management of large multi-
nationals perceive a community of interests with the South
African Government and local business groups in their efforts
to expand trading ties northward on the continent. Instead
of risking their capital by direct investment in what they
consider to be unstable African-governed countries, they
can gain a foothold by working within a rapidly growing,
business-like economy, run by people very much like themselves. 18
Third, the wages of African manufacturing workers are only
an eighth of what U.S. workers receive. This combined with
a low tax rate insures U.S. firms in South Africa a large
profit margin. Officially, U.S. manufacturing firms reported
an average profit rate of around 16 percent, compared to 2.3
percent for the rest of Africa and 11 percent in the United
19States.
U.S. investment in South Africa manufacturing has
helped to build an integrated, and increasingly self-sufficient
national economy. In other African states, U.S. firms have
generally built last-stage assembly and processing plants
which continue to import parts and materials from their U.S.
based factories. In South Africa, in contrast, U.S. firms
have established linkages between their manufacturing plants





and the local economy. This has contributed to the building
of an increasingly advanced technological foundation for
South Africa's industrial sector. In short, U.S. multi-
nationals have contributed significantly to making South
Africa's economy sanction resistant.
C. WORLD ORDER INTERESTS
U.S. world order interests in Southern Africa revolve
around four issues: (1) the geostrategic importance of
maintaining Western control of the sea lanes around the
Cape of Good Hope; (2) the Soviet/Cuban threat to Southern
Africa; (3) South Africa as the dominant military power in
Africa; and (4) South African Nuclear capabilities.
1. The Cape Route
The argument for the importance of the Cape Route
can be stated simply. From the middle of the 1960 's onward,
and ever higher volume of imports to the United States and
Western Europe have transited the southern tip of Africa.
Reasons for this are threefold: (1) the overall expansion
of imports from the Indian Ocean littoral states; (2) the
long closure of the Suez Canal; and (3) the growing use of
oil supertankers that are too large to use the Suez Canal.
In 1965 .8 million barrels of oil per day transitted
the Cape in route to the West; by 197 6 the total had grown
20
to 18 million barrels. In a report on U.S. policy toward




Southern Africa, a map was prepared showing the Cape Route
as the shipping lane carrying the largest volume of oil
2
1
traffic in the world. But oil is not the only commodity,
over 27,000 ships per year transit the Cape, half of which
stop at South African ports for logistics. 22 In 197 8,
it was estimated that 70 percent of the strategic raw
materials used by NATO are transported via the Cape
23Route.
These figures show that a potential danger for the
United States and the West exists. General George S. Brown
made the following appraisal:
"The threat to the Atlantic area is primarily from
the Soviet Union. Increasing Soviet naval capability
to operate along the littoral of Africa have put
increasing pressure on our ability to protect important
South African trade routes which provide materials
essential to the United States and Western Europe."
2. The Communist Threat
With the success of the liberation movements in
Angola, iMozambique and Zimbabwe, the overall balance of
power in Southern Africa changed considerably. Because
21Foreign Policy Study Foundation, South Africa: Time
Running Out
, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1981, p. 305.
22Official Yearbook of the Republic of South Africa
,
Pretoria: South African Department of Information, 1982,
p. 324
.
23John Peel, "The Growing Threat to Freedom and the
North Atlantic Alliance" , South African International ,
October 1978, p. 79.
24General G.S. Brown, "Current JCS Theater Appraisals",
Commanders Digest , March 17, 1977, p. 21.
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the Soviet Union and their allies were willing to supply
the liberation movements with arms, they have gained
influence with the leaders of those countries. This is
particularly true in Angola where Soviet aid and Cuban
troops provided crucial support for the MPLA as it consolidated
its rule after the Portuguese withdrawal. In Mozambique
and Zimbabwe, however, the amount of Soviet aid was far more
modest. The Soviet Union was but one of many nations that
supported FRELIMO, and until recently the Chinese were the
preferred communist benefactor. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU
popular front government of Robert Mugabe showed its disdain
at Soviet meddling by delaying the granting of diplomatic
relations until ties were established with the West.
There are many ideas and theories associated with
the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. One
realistic appraisal is that if the Soviet Union and its proxies
are able to gain access to ports and airfields in Mozambique,
Angola, and other African littoral states, they will be
in a position to successfully harass Western shipping.
Captain J. M. Brink of the South African Navy argues that,
"The strangulation of the merchant shipping flow
across the South Atlantic by the Russian Navy would have
been completely impossible ten years ago. At present
this must be considered a viable possibility . "25
25Captain J. M. Brink, "The South Atlantic and South




3. South Africa as a Regional Military Power
South Africa is clearly the strongest military power
on the African Continent. In response to the mandatory
arms embargo enacted by the United Nations in November 1977,
South Africa's Armament Manufacturing Corporation began
domestic production of a vast range of advanced weapons
systems, including jet aircraft, armored tanks and fast
naval patrol craft. In addition, South Africa may also be
a nuclear power. Richard Betts, a leading expert on this
subject, flatly asserts that "with their highly developed
nuclear establishment, including unsafeguarded uranium
enrichment facilities, Pretoria could build a bomb at any
time it wishes .
"
Many analysts, having observed South Africa's military
establishment and sophisticated facilities, quickly conclude
that South Africa must be integrated into the Western
alliance system. Since South Africa has the desire to carry
out regional tasks on behalf of the West, it is simply
asserted that this would be beneficial to the West in
27times of hostility or war. In reality, it should not be
taken as a foregone conclusion that South Africa's military
support would invariably be helpful. In any war in which
26Richard R. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?",
International Security , Fall, 1979, p. 91
27Larry Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa
to the United States", African Affairs, Fall, 1979, p. 167.
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South Africa was an ally, her manpower and material would be
offset by alienating third world countries. While South
Africa has actively courted Western ties, her foreign
policy has shown a remarkable disdain for Western views on
her strategic interests. In many ways, South Africa's
willingness to advance American interests is similar to
Israel's willingness to do the same. In short, South Africa
is a regional superpower, like Iran or Israel, that is only
willing to support American interests provided they coincide
with or advance her own interests.
4 . South African Nuclear Capabilities
South African nuclear capabilities represent a
potential danger to the cause of nonproliferation. This
danger manifests itself in two ways. First, South Africa
clearly has the capability to build a nuclear weapon any
time she chooses. This subject is addressed in Chapter six
as a case study.
Second, South Africa is a source of nuclear technology
and materials for other states. At present South Africa
2 8
requires safeguards on all exports of uranium and technology.
Continuation of this policy is crucial to the cause of
nonproliferation. One example of where this is especially
true is South African exports of natural uranium to
Argentina.
28
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Argentina operates a heavy water reactor which burns
natural uranium. This type of reactor can be operated without
undue economic penalty at a low fuel irradiation level. This
mode of operation maximizes the production of plutonium. 29
With an unsafeguarded supply of uranium, Argentina would need
only to build a chemical extraction plant to obtain weapons
grade plutonium.
D. IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS
U.S. ideological interests in South Africa rest with
our Bill of Rights and with the transcendent claim of our
Declaration of Independence, namely that legitimate govern-
ment must rest upon the consent of the governed. At present
it makes little sense to speak of civil rights in South
Africa. In that Republic every civil right can be denied
if the authorities so choose. Few safeguards of a substantive
or procedural kind exist, in effect, all South Africans
are at the mercy of the state. Civil rights have become
privileges exercisable at the discretion of the government.
Two key laws, the Internal Security Act and the Terrorism
Act, enable the South African government to prosecute anyone
who might present a challenge to their regime. The Internal
Security Act of 197 6, defines communism as any doctrine
which "aims at bringing about any political, industrial,
29 IBID, p. 279.
Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 7
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social, or economic change within the Republic by the
promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or
omissions", or which "aims at the encouragement of feelings
of hostility between the European and non-European races
of the Republic, where the consequences are calculated to
further the achievement of political, industrial, social,
or economic change by the promotion of disorder by unlawful
acts". Peaceful bus boycotts in response to rate hikes,
have been classified as communist inspired seditious acts.
The Terrorism Act reduces the burden of proof for the
prosecution even further by defining terrorism/sabotage
as any act embarrassing the affairs of state. It is hard
to imagine any peaceful activity aimed at bringing about
reform that would not be covered.
A crucial test of the current status of civil rights
in a country is the protection accorded personal freedom.
A provision of the Terrorism Act provides for the indefinite
detention of any person suspected of terrorism or having
any information concerning terrorism. Detention is at the
sole discretion of a police officer of the rank of Lieutenant
31Colonel or above. In such cases, solitary confinement
is authorized and the courts are expressly precluded from
intervening. In 197 6, detention powers were expanded to




public order. Detainees are treated as prisoners awaiting
trial and may not challenge their detention in court.
The Internal Security Act authorizes another
practice known as banning. A banned person is restricted
to a certain magisterial district and prevented from entering
educational institutions, publishing houses, courts and
other specified places. They are barred from attending
political, social, and other gatherings and prohibited from
communicating with specified persons. In its most extreme
form, banning amounts to house arrest, with the individual
usually confined to their residence for twelve hours a day
during the work week and twenty-four hours a day on weekends.
The procedures are totally arbitrary, with no opportunity
to contest the order for those being banned. The courts
have no power to intervene, and the authorities need give
no reason for the banning.
What has made South Africa the outcast of the entire
world is not its civil rights violations, but rather its
legislated system of white minority rule, apartheid.
The 1948 electoral victory of the National Party marked
a watershed in South African politics. The centuries of
subjugation, first to the Dutch East India Company and then
to the British throne, were over. The Afrikaner, through




of his own destiny and determined to maintain that control.
The manifestation of this feeling marked the transition
from an ethnic movement attempting to maintain its cultural
purity to an incumbent elite striving for national survival.
The over-riding and ever present threat perceived by
the Afrikaner has been a fear of being overwhelmed by the
black majority. In response to this fear the Afrikaner has
constructed a system that dictates to the majority in South
Africa where they must live, what kinds of jobs they may
have, and what their behavior toward each other and toward
the Whites must be. In short, every aspect of an African's
life is defined by the White authorities. Any display of
resistance is met by force.
E. TRADEOFFS
Prior to the Portuguese coup in 197 4, the United States
was able to realize its national interests in Southern
Africa through a policy of benign neglect. The sticky
dilemmas associated with tradeoffs between categories of
interests were largely avoided because attention was focused
elsewhere.
Following the rapid Portuguese decolonization, the
political context of Southern Africa changed in two ways.
First, Soviet/Cuban intervention in Angola's civil war
introduced the East-West dimension. This focused U.S.
attention on the region and elevated the intensity of our
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world-order interest to the "major" level. Secondly, the
termination of Portuguese rule ended the era of European
Colonialism in Africa. With the demise of colonialism, the
full attention of Black African states shifted to the question
of White minority rule in Southern Africa.
Under the Carter Administration, the intensity assigned
to ideological interests rose to the "major" level. This
increase in significance reflected both Carter's overall
stand on the human rights issue and the growing perception
that White minority rule was inherently unstable.
Once ideological interests had been elevated to the
same intensity level as economic and world order interests,
the question of tradeoffs between the three had to be
addressed
.
Any discussion of the question of tradeoffs should be
at least two dimensional. One dimension deals with longterm
vs. shorterm objectives while the other deals with the
inherent contradictions of dealing with the Afrikaner regime
on economic and world order interest while condeming it
for its human rights violations.
Longterm objectives clearly represent the way the
United States would like to see the situation in South
Africa evolve. This represents the psychological milieu
of the planner and may or may not reflect the operational
milieu found in South Africa.
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Longterm U.S. interests would be optimally served by
a peaceful transition from the Western oriented, Afrikaner
government to a Western oriented, multi-racial government
that protects the rights of all of its citizens. This
peaceful transition would ease the tensions between South
Africa and the West. Economic and world order interests
could then be jointly pursued without the risk of alienating
the majority of Black Africans in South Africa or jeopardizing
U.S. interest in Black Africa.
The operational environment in South Africa suggests
that a peaceful transition is highly unlikely. Without
meaningful pressure, both internal and external, there is
little motivation for the Afrikaner to relinquish any of
his political power. Thus, American pressure is required in
achieving the optimal longterm environment. This pressure,
though, has certain ramifications for U.S. efforts to
achieve its short-term interests.
Over the short term (3-5 years) , the pursuit of ideological
interest will be at the expense of certain economic and
world order interests. A Nambian settlement, expansion
of U.S. investment, South African cooperation over uranium
shipments and U.S. access to South African bases are examples
of areas where close cooperation would serve short term
interests at the expense of long range objectives.

III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION
A. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
South Africa's pariah status in the world today is largely
the result of its institutionalized form of racism. South
African society is divided by law into four distinct groups:
Whites, Colour eds, Asians and Africans. Firm social
boundaries exist and any interaction between groups is
governed by social custom, as well as, a series of laws
enacted since 1948. In particular, the dominant White division
is totally endogamous by law, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages
Act of 1949 and the Immorality Act of 1957, while other
groups are largely endogamous by custom.
Within each group, divisions reflect ethnic and class
lines. Whites are divided into Afrikaner and English-speaking
communities: the Coloureds into Christian and Muslim
communities; the Asians into Hindu and Muslim communities,
and the Africans are divided along traditional tribal lines.
While the group divisions are rigid, community lines are not.
Within each of the four groups, social stratification based
on education, occupation, and wealth has emerged.
The debate over the basis for apartheid (separateness)
can be divided into two main schools of thought. The first,
sees racism as the chief determinant of White South African
attitudes. This reflects the official position of the
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Afrikaner leadership: each individual race has the moral right
to ensure the survival of its divinely ordained identity;
segregation is the only practical solution to racial tension.
The second school of thought, the revisionists, view class
struggle as the chief determinant of White attitudes. The
system of apartheid was designed primarily to assist the
capitalist mode of exploitation in South Africa.
1. The Segregationists
The segregationist line of thought has its roots in
nineteenth century South Africa.
"Our forefathers believed, and we still believe today,
that God himself made the diversity of peoples on earth
. . . Interracial residence and intermarriage are not only
a disgrace, but are forbidden by law. It is, however,
not only the skin of the white South African that differs
from that of the non-white. The white stands on a much
higher plane of civilization and is more developed.
Whites must so live, learn and work that we shall not
sink to the cultural level of the non-whites . "33
White South African opposition to the segregationist
school of thought can be divided into two groups. The first,
sees the system as immoral and, regardless of its viability,
insufferable. The second group, which includes the English
speaking opposition parties, view apartheid as a great divisive
factor in South African society and question its longterm
viability. Accepting racism as the basis of apartheid, they
prescribe political reform in the hope that the introduction
of political liberty and the ending of injustice will
sufficiently defuse the present tension, to allow for peaceful
33Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African Politics
,
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, p. 112.
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change. The costs of maintaining the present system are seen
as too high.
2. The Marxist View
The Marxist view is based on a Marxian analysis of the
South African economy. The Marxists claim that the South
African economy is a classic example of an imperialist economic
system, with the exploiter class located partly in South
African business, partly in overseas bodies which financed
South African economic development, and partly in the White
34
workers. South African prosperity is attributable to
cheap labor made through the calculated impoverishment of the
African Reserves.
Martin Legassick, a Marxian economist, has argued
that "whereas the earlier policy of segregation was at the
bottom of an attempt to apply a system of extraeconomically
controlled labor to mining and farming, apartheid was the
application of a cheap forced labor policy to secondary
industry." Manufacturing, he argued, required the recruit-
ment of semi-skilled operatives for factory employment on a
large scale. After World War II, some employers advocated
a government-sponsored policy for the settlement of African
workers in towns, with houses, amenities and pension rights,
while others advocated the intensification of Black labor
T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History ,





migrancy as an alternative. The National Party victory in
1948, Legassick asserts, represented a victory for the latter
group.
The issue, though, is far more complex than either
group proposes. Racial prejudice clearly runs deep in the
White community and recent events throughout Africa have not
eased white fears of majority rule. The economic dimension
also figures in significantly. No incumbent elite wants to
give up its privileged position. Thus, the basis for apartheid
is a combination of the reasons cited by both schools of
thought. Which factor is more important is highly dependent
upon who is being questioned. Conservative Afrikaners are
willing to sacrifice economic growth to maintain segregation,
while industrialists are willing to ease segregation to diffuse
Black resentment.
B. KEY ACTORS
1. The National Party
The National Party (NP) is clearly the dominant actor
on the political scene in South Africa. For the forseeable
future the decisions the NP makes under the leadership and
guidance of Prime Minister P.W. Botha will decide the rate
and course of change in South Africa. To understand how
these political decisions will be reached, one needs to under-
stand how the NP operates.
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The NP is a grass roots, ethnic based party. Each
province has its own constitution, party machine and annual
congress. Candidates for Parliament are nominated by the
branch committees of the local constituencies and approved
by the provincial leader. The provincial leader is chosen
by the annual party congress. The Prime Minister is chosen
by the NP caucus
.
The decision-making process in Afrikanerdom is neither
authoritarian nor democratic. Decisions are generally made
by the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Differences in ideology
or strategy are hashed out privately by the cabinet. Once
a consensus is reached, the Prime Minister, with a united
cabinet, presents the decision to the NP caucus for action
in the Parliament.
"Both cabinet and caucus operate within the confines
of trust and obligation. The caucus has faith that
the cabinet with its access to superior information will
act in the general interests of the Afrikaner people;
the cabinet trusts the caucus members to fulfill their
obligation to defend unpopular decisions to the people
at large. "36
Ultimately a cabinet decision rests on an evaluation of
whether the decision can be sold to the caucus and by
extension to the provincial congresses.
2 . Opposition Parties
a. English-speaking Constituent Parties
The Progressive Federal Party (PFP) is an amalga-
mation of supporters of the former liberal party, left-wing
Heribert, Adam and Herman Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized




members of the former United Party and a few former National
Party supporters. Since the first Progressive Party member
was elected to parliament in 1961, the Party has grown in
strength. In 1981, the PFP became the official opposition
with 26 seats in Parliament.
The PFP draws its parliamentary support largely
from upper class, English-speaking constituencies. It enjoys
the support of two influential interest groups, big business,
including Harry F. Oppenheimer, Chairman of the powerful
Anglo-American Corporation and the English-speaking press.
While very few Afrikaners support the party, a third of PFP
parliamentarians are Afrikaners, including party leader
Frederick van Zyl Slabbert.
During the 1960's and 1970 *s, the PFP consistently
voted against the enactment of National Party legislation
aimed at extending the powers of the executive at the expense
of the judiciary and the legislature. The PFP has strongly
identified itself with the three pillars of Western democracy:
freedom of the press, judicial review and the accountability
of the executive to the legislative. The party has come out
against the system of Apartheid, calling for a repeal of
discriminatory laws, protection for all South Africans with
a Bill of Rights and a common citizenship open to all regard-
less of color. The issue of franchisement should be resolved
through negotiations between the various population groups
.
To eliminate the possibility of a reversal from White
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domination to Black domination, the PFP recommends a rigid
constitutional framework which would allow all South
Africans to participate in the political process.
The New Republic Party (NRP) was formed in
197 7, when the United Party dissolved. The party draws most
of its support from English-speaking constituencies. In
1981, on a platform advocating a loose federal approach with
maximum devaluation of power to local communities, the NRP
won 8 seats in parliament.
The inability of either the PFP or NRP to gain
enough electoral support to become a potential ruling party
demonstrates that the NP remains the most effective spokesman
for White interests. While this indicates that the initiative
for political change rests with the NP , the direction it
takes may reflect a response to two Afrikaner parties on its
right.
b. Right Wing Parties
By the middle of the 1960 's the National Party
had clearly established itself as the dominant political
force in South African politics. Since then, the only
substantial threat to its position has come from its own
right wing. During a parliamentary setting in 1969, Albert
Hertzog, a former cabinet member, accused the NP of
deviating from its original principles. "He labeled English-
speaking white South Africans as liberals and maintained
that only Calvinist Afrikaners could be entrusted to rule
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37South Africa." Prime Minister B. J. Vorster responded by
expelling Hertzog from the party and calling for a general
election. Hertzog retaliated to his explusion by forming
the Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP)
.
The underlying rationale for the new HNP was a
perception by Hertzog and his followers that the policies of
the NP were diluting the core values of Afrikanderdom. The
HNP regards English speakers as "Afrikaners in making" and
espouses that Afrikaans should be the sole national language.
NP economic policies are seen as opportunistic and the
position that economic gain should not stand in the way
of racial segregation was advanced.
In the 1969 election the HNP made a poor showing
with only 3.59 percent of the vote. The NP ' s share was
54.86 percent, down from 58.6 percent in 1966. The real
impact of the split can be better seen in the 1981 election
results. The HNP failed to win a seat but the 14.1 percent
it polled turned many previously safe NP seats into marginal
seats. The HNP attracted 30 perecent of the Afrikaner vote.
Had the NP not attracted roughly 30 percent of the English-
speaking voters, their hegemonic position in parliament might
have been in jeopardy.
The early 1980 's witnessed the development of
an even stronger threat from the right. Dr. Andries P.
37Thompson, P. 10 5.
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Treurnicht, head of the influential Transvaal NP Party, resigned
his cabinet seat in protest to Prime Minister Botha's plan to
establish a tricameral Parliament. When the NP caucus
accepted the Prime Minister's plan, Dr. Treurnicht and sixteen
other NPs left the party and formed the Conservative Party.
The Conservative Party, which Dr. Treurnicht
claims is the authentic voice of the Afrikaner people, had
its first test of strength in the May by-elections. Dr.
Treurnicht was reelected to Parliament on a Conservative
Party ticket, while Tom Langley of the CP was defeated, in
a close election, with Manpower Ministers Stephanus P. Botha.
The seat Tom Langley had vacated in Pretoria to run against
Botha was won by the NP . While the NP picked up a seat
previously held by the Conservative Party, the election
demonstrated that the NP has a serious contender on its
right for the Afrikaner vote.
3. The African National Congress
The African National Congress (ANC) is the oldest and
strongest of the black liberation movements. Formed in 1912,
by a group of black middle class South Africans, the ANC
operated legally in South Africa until its banning in 1960.
The transformation this organization has undergone is
representative of the changes in black attitudes during the
twentieth century.
Prior to the mid-1940' s, the leadership of the ANC
believed in the benign influence of Christianity and placed
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faith in the promises of trusteeship. The idea of trying to
organize mass protest was not only ruled out by the dictates
of practicality, but also by a sensitivity to the norms of
civilized behavior. Their policy was one of elite advocacy
and mass passivity. This middle class elite believed it
was far wiser to proceed cautiously and responsibly, addressing
appeals to reason rather than emotion. Outbursts of anger
would only evoke stronger white repression and delay the
day that blacks would be recognized by whites as civilized
equals
.
The ANC initially sought gradual reform through moral
and political appeals. ANC leaders called for an end to
discrimination in political, educational, and industrial
fields. They accepted as equitable a qualified franchise
that would limit black voters to those who could pass a
"civilization test" based on education, property or wage
qualification.
During the 1940 's, the conservative old guard was
challenged by a younger more militant leadership. Dis-
illusioned with the failures of the organization's traditional
methods, the ANC Youth League began advocating a program
of militant African nationalism and mass action. Race
conscious nationalism was seen by them as the only force
potent enough to inspire the African masses to action.
Their goal, as African leaders, was to teach Africans not to
be ashamed of being black. Pride in a shared African
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heritage, confident expectations of the future and a love
for Africa's God given blackness would forge a positive self
image that would bond all Africans together. In 1949, the
ANC adopted the Youth League's program of militant African
nationalism and mass action.
The 1950' s represented a period of civil
disobedience by non-white. In 1952, the ANC, with Indian
support, launched a nationwide civil disobedience movement
aimed at challenging white supremacy. Although more than
8,000 Africans and Indians went to jail for defying apartheid
laws, the movement never came close to sparking a general
strike. Its chief ramifications were an increase in ANC
membership from less than twenty thousand to over one
hundred thousand and a governmental crackdown on Black
leaders and their White sympathizers. Throughout the decade
non-violent civil disobedience remained the official policy
of the ANC.
On March 21, 1960, an event occurred that changed the
context of black/white relations in South Africa. At
Sharpeville, an African Township thirty-five miles south of
Johannesburg, white police opened fire on a large crowd
of antipass protestors; sixty-seven Africans, including some
women and children, were killed and 18 6 were wounded. The
incident led to violent confrontations between Blacks and
security forces throughout the country. In response, the
government declared a state of emergency and ruthlessly
49

suppressed opposition. The ANC, along with the Pan-Africanist
Congress, were forced underground.
The next two decades witnessed the rise of a Black
generation more opposed to compromise and more willing to
risk armed confrontation than its predecessors. Reflecting
this, the official policy of the ANC changed from one of
non-violence to one in which violence would be used to advance
reforms, not to indiscriminately destroy South Africa. ANC
attacks have not been against Whites but have largely been
against symbols of White power; the SASOL plant, the Koeburg
Nuclear Power Plant, and the military base at Voortrekkerhoogte
At present, the ANC is the most powerful of the
exile groups, with offices throughout the world. Its
governing council is multi-racial and encompasses western
oriented politicans as well as Marxists. Their official
position is that the struggle is against White domination
not Whites. After liberation, any Whites who accept African
rule would be welcomed, those who could not, would be free
to leave.
4. Black Consciousness
A development of major significance was the emer-
gence of the Black Consciousness movement during the late
1960's. The movement was founded by Steve Biko on the




and self help. The aim of the movement's leaders was the
psychological emancipation of Blacks from the sense of
inferiority that centuries of White domination had fostered.
The mode of operation of the movement involved
community self-help projects aimed at instilling a sense
of self-reliance and community solidarity. The movement was
embraced by students (SASO) , as well as adults throughout
the Black community.
Cooperation with liberal or radical Whites was
firmly rejected. Liberals were seen as well meaning but
were identified as a force that had traditionally weakened
the revolutionary zeal of Blacks. White radicals were to be
avoided because of a desire not to become involved with the
foreign ideology of Marxism.
Both the movement and the organizations associated
with it were banned in 1977. No reasons were given by the
government, but it is widely assumed that the banning was in
response to widespread resistance to Bantu education among
African youths.
Black consciousness as an ideology has survived
the banning. The principles which the movement espoused
have been adopted by other African political organizations.
The real impact though, has been the rise in the conscious-
ness level of the Black people of South Africa. Among
3 8
Robert Price and Carl Rosberg, The Apartheid Regime :
Political Power and Racial Domination , Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1980, p. 101.
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students and Black urban leaders is the perception that
they are not helpless and they can change the system is
growing.
5 . Inkatha
Another Black organization with strong political
implications in Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Siswe (Inkatha)
.
Prior to 1975, Inkatha was a Zulu organization involved in
promoting the cultural traditions and national solidary
of the Zulu people. Since then, Chief Buthelezi has
attemped to turn his Zulu based organization into a nation-
wide movement transcending ethnic lines
.
In his efforts to appeal to all Africans, Buthelezi
has borrowed heavily from both the ANC and the Black
Consciousness movements. The aims of Inkatha, (1) to
promote cultural liberation, i.e., to overcome dependency and
to instill a sense of pride and independence in Africans,
(2) to promote community development along lines of self-
help and self-reliance in order to combat problems of
underdevelopment and poor morale, (3) to work toward a
change in the educational system for Blacks in South Africa,
(4) to abolish race discrimination, and most importantly,
(5) to achieve the full incorporation of Blacks into
political decision-making in South Africa, clearly reflected
the ideology of the Black Consciousness movement while the
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colors, songs, and slogans of Inkatha are the same as those
of the ANC. 39
Inkatha is predominantly a Natal-based rural
organization, with branches outside of Natal in areas where
people of Zulu origin are concentrated. Recent growth,
however, has shown expansion into urban areas and among
the Xhosa. With its current membership of over 300,000
Inkatha is clearly the largest Black political organization
in South African history.
C. FORCES AT WORK WITHIN SOUTH AFRICA
The second step in an attempt to achieve cultural
relativity is to identify the forces at work within the
society. In this case study of South Africa, the forces
will be divided into two groups: those favoring change
and those inhibiting change.
1. Forces Favoring Change
The strongest force for limited change in South
Africa is clearly the government of Prime Minister P. W.
Botha. Events during the past decade have led to a change
in ideology on the part of the leadership of the NP . Instead
of an ideology based on the civil-religious themes of
Afrikaner history, the new leadership has adopted an





leadership to shape internal change without exposing itself
to charges of betrayal of doctrine.
Two key speeches by Prime Minister P. W. Botha provide
an insight into both the intent behind and the direction of
the proposed changes. The first speech was made to the
Annual Natal NP Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979. In
this speech Botha unveiled a twelve point plan aimed at
delivering South Africa from the total onslaught. "A striking
feature concerning the 12-point plan, has been the Government's
total commitment to it and its attempt to present it as the
one and only hope that all South Africans have to deliver
40them from the total onslaught. This plan has become the
basis of the government's Total National Strategy. The
second speech was made at Bloemfontein in August 1982. This
speech unveiled the constitutional structure in which Whites,
Coloureds, and Indians would share in the political process.
Botha's twelve point plan represents an attempt at
defining policy objectives across a wide spectrum of government
activities, in response to a diversity of interests. The
points are purposely vague to allow for a great deal of
political manuevering in both interpretation and implementation
In short, the plan represents an astute "trial balloon".
The first four points of the plan clearly demonstrates
that grand apartheid (separateness) is still the cornerstone
Deon Geldenhuys, Some Foreing Policy Implications of
South Africa's "Total National Strategy" , Braanfontein:
South African Institute of International Affairs, 1982, p. 11
54

of NP policy. The first point deals with "the recognition
and acceptance of the existence of multi-nationalism and
of minorities in the Republic of South Africa." The second
addresses the concept of "vertical differentiation with
a built-in principle of self-determination at as
many levels as possible." Based on these premises, points
three and four deal with the role of the non-whites in
South African society. For the blacks, point three provides
for the "establishment of constitutional structures by
the Black people to make the highest degree of self-government
possible for them in states that are consolidated as far
as possible." Part of the right of self-determination for
Blacks is "to allow them to grow towards independence".
Point four addresses the role of the Coloured and Indian
communities within the Republic. These communities are
treated differently than Blacks, "the division of powers
between White, Coloureds and Indians will be conducted
within a system of consultation and co-responsibility so
far as common interests are concerned."
Points five through seven represent an attempt to
minimize the self-defeating effects of petty apartheid
without weakening the idea of separate development itself.
Point five commits the Government to "the acceptance of
the principle that, where at all possible, each population
group should have its own schools and live in its own
community. In my view (Botha speaking) this is not
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discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights."
Point six calls for the removal of "hurtful and unnecessary
discriminatory measures... in particular those that create
bad feelings." The seventh point provides the rationale for
the easing of petty apartheid, "the recognition of economic
interdependence and 'the need for* properly planned utilization
of manpower .
"
Points eight through twelve deal with an outward
looking, regional defense posture. Central to strong posture
is "the maintenance of effective decision-making by the
state, which rests on a strong Defense Force to guarantee
orderly government as well as efficient, clean administration"
and "the maintenance of free enterprise as the basis of
our economic and financialy policy."
The fourth point is at the center of the present
controversy over change in South Africa. In a speech in
August 1982, Prime Minister Botha spelled out the
Constitutional framework that would lead to "consultation
and co-responsibility" between the Whites, Coloureds,
and Indians. His plan, described as simple and understandable,
would place consolidated execute powers in the hands of a
President and allow for the formation of a tricameral
parliaments
.
As proposed the new framework would include:
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1. A new Office of the President, which would combine
the present posts of Prime Minister and State President.
The President would be elected by an electoral college
consisting of 50 Whites, 25 Coloureds and 13 Indians.
The members of the electoral college would be MP's chosen
by their respective chambers.
2. A Cabinet appointed by the President. Appointees
need not be members of Parliament.
3. A President's Council consisting of 25 Presidential
appointees and 20 Whites, 10 Coloureds and 5 Indians
elected by their respective chambers.
4. A Tricameral parliament consisting of three chambers,
one White, one Coloured and one Indian. MP's would be
elected by their respective communities.
Legislative functions would be divided by the
President into matters of community concern and matters of
common concern. Community matters would be resolved by
legislation passed by the relevant chamber. Matters of
common concern would require legislation passed by all
three chambers voting separately. Conflict between the
three chambers on bills of common concern would be settled
by an authoritative finding of the President's Council.
The initiation of legislation affecting community interests
would be handled by Cabinet committees comprised of members
of the different communities. While matters of common




The Botha committment to change reflects certain
factors within the South African society that could be
classified as forces for change. The potent Afrikaner
nationalism of the recent past has given way to a more
pragmatic version. Many Afrikaners, as well as most
English-speakers, have begun to realize that a certain
amount of change is inevitable.
Demographic forces are changing the face of the
population. Since 1948, when the NP came to power, the
White population has declined from almost 25 percent of
the population to about 15 percent; by century's end it
will probably account for no more than 12 percent. This
demographic change dictates that the labor force will
become increasingly Black. To meet this need, even larger
numbers of Blacks will have to be permanently settled
and educated in White areas. Changes in White attitudes
reflect a willingness to accept this, provided the Blacks
are segregated and their economic improvement does not
come at the expense of White workers.
The ability of Blacks to realize their power is
on the rise. Higher levels of education and movements like
Black Consciousness have altered Black perceptions. No
longer do Blacks, especially urban educated Blacks, feel
that they are helpless to change their position. Growing
Black political organizations, like the urban councils and





Ten years ago, the idea of expanding the laager to
include Indians and Coloureds was heresay. Botha successors
might find the processes of urbanization, education, and
socialization have mitigated the opposition to Black
participation
.
2. Factors Inhibiting Change
Possible factors inhibiting change in South Africa,
while varied, can be divided into two groups. The first
deals with present attitudes and perceptions. The second
encompasses the present power structure in Southern Africa.
a. Attitudes
The most important factor inhibiting the prospects
for change in South Africa is the unwillingness of Whites
to transition to majority rule. For Afrikaners and the 30
percent of the English-speakers that vote for the NP , this
means an unwillingness to accept any Blacks into the central
political process, even a federated power sharing arrangement.
Other Whites, including supporters of the PFP and NRP
,
favor some kind of an arrangement that would protect the
rights of Whites, while allowing the Blacks a voice in
government.
Another factor is the large political and
economic investment the present government and the Black
homeland leaders have in separate development. Bureaucratic
obstructionism can be anticipated by both Whites and Blacks
who have vested interests in seeing the present situation
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continue. The zeal for the system by Blacks is likely to
be stronger, since they would not only lose their jobs but
would have to deal with charges that they sold their people
out
.
Recent public opinion polls show that there is
a perception by Whites, especially Afrikaners that the
present unrest is the result of outside agitation. This
perception is important because it misdirects White efforts
to diffuse the situation. Expenditures for Black education
and welfare are needed, not increased military spending.
The recent constitutional reforms reflected an effort to
diffuse the tensions with Indians and Coloureds but ignored
the main issue, Black participation in the political process.
Outside agitation is not the reason Blacks reject the
idea of separate development.
b. The Power Structure
Analogies drawn between Iran or Nicaragua and
South Africa fail to recognize the present power structure
in Southern Africa. The White regime has both the capability
and will to crush any serious challenge to its rule.
Internally the coercive apparatus is capable of sealing off
Black townships if violence arises. The South African
intelligence apparatus has shown the capability to infiltrate
Black organizations and has demonstrated its ability to
handle any large scale guerilla activity. Random isolated
attacks are all the guerrillas can mount.
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On the regional scale, South Africa has the military-
power to dissuade its neighbors from actively supporting
guerrilla movements. Cross border raids into Angola,
Mozambique and Lesotha have been conducted at will and
without any substantial resistance. South Africa is capable
of striking the ANC or PAC anywhere in Southern Africa with
impunity
.
The net impact of the present power structure is a
military weak revolutionary movement. Frontline states
allow "offices" to be opened in their territories, but
active support is mainly in the form of rhetoric. Soviet
aid, which proved crucial to the national liberation
movements in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, has reflected
tokenism. As long as South Africa is able to retain its
present military prowess, external intervention/influence
will remain limited.
D. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Any analysis of potential change in South Africa must
begin with a fundamental reality, both Blacks and Whites
hold certain positions to be non-negotiable. For Blacks,
an acceptable solution must give them a share of genuine
political power. For Whites, that solution cannot be based
on a winner take all form of majority rule.
There is little evidence on which to question the
short-term (1 to 5 years) survivability of White power South
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Africa. Analogies drawn from Iran or Nicaragua ignore the
realities of the power structure in South Africa. Threatening
or potentially threatening organizations are ruthlessly
suppressed. The regime is backed by a substantial reservoir
of trained, well armed, highly motivated Whites. For the
forseeable future, both the will and the means will be
present in sufficient quantities to handle any revolt by
Blacks
.
The ingredients of a potential revolution, however, are
present. A heightened level of political awareness and
unity among urban Blacks, combined with an unprecedented
degree of determination and even optimism about the potential
for Black power presents problems for the White regime.
The gap between reality and aspirations for Blacks is growing,
expanding the level of frustration in the Black community.
Both the government and its opponents recognize that
the urban areas with their industrial installations are
the primary targets and points of potential vulnerability
for political action or physical attack. The short term
threat includes mass protests, urban turmoil, strikes,
boycotts, sabotage and sporadic terrorist violence. The aim
of such actions is not a frontal attack on the system, but
rather an effort to wear down White resistance to change,
discredit Pretoria in the eyes of the world, instill
political awareness and discipline among Blacks, raise the
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price of maintaining the status quo and focus attention on
specific grievances.^ 1
In terms of organization, tactics, and resources, the
revolt is still in an embryonic stage. While it is too
early to predict the course and extent of physical violence
by Blacks in South Africa, the foreseeable outcome of
violent challenge to the regime is predictable. Physical
repression of a scale not yet seen is not only probable
but clearly within the capabilities of the Whites- White
public opinion would overwhelmingly support repressive
measures aimed at maintaining public order.
At present, urban Blacks lack the means to confront the
authorities. The government has the ability to cut off
Black townships from food, water, electricity, telephone
services, transportation and jobs. Spontaneous violence
in what amounts to a sealable ghetto could mobilize domestic
and international public opinion but probably would not
serve as an effective military tactic. "Even under the
most extreme assumptions about underground effectiveness in
organization and the smuggling of arms and explosives, the
current possibilities appear to fall short of enabling





Foreign Policy Study Foundation, p. 236.
42 IBID, p. 237.
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In the countryside the threat is in the form of small
groups of men trying to infiltrate across the border and
make their way to urban centers. To date there has been
no evidence of guerrilla cells in rural areas. Popular
support for guerrillas had been confined to the politically
conscious urban dweller and not the conservative, largely
uneducated rural resident. Of no little note, is the fact
that little of South Africa's rural landscape lends itself
to guerrilla tactics. Desert/semi arid grassland offers no
chance to hide.
Outside support for an active guerrilla movement has
been limited for two reasons. First, South Africa,
possessing a military and economic base that dwarfs the
combined totals of the front line states, has demonstrated
her willingness to strike any neighbor that supports or
turns a blind eye to guerrilla activities. Secondly, and
probably more important, is the perception that the time
is not right for a military challenge. The costs of
unsuccessful attempts appear to far outweigh any potential
gains
.
The state of flux in South Africa suggests alternative
scenarios for the future. Three scenarios, based on
different assumptions, will be presented in an effort to
establish the probable range of events in South Africa.
Regional and international implications will be included.
These scenarios are not meant to be all inclusive or
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mutually exclusive. Overlap is inevitable and the course of
events may include elements of both or elements not found
in either.
1. Scenario One
Scenario one represents the optimistic end of the
spectrum. In this scenario the reformist movement of
Prime Minister Botha is able to prevail over the regressive
forces to his right. Black opposition leaders, however,
view this reform as merely a modernization of apartheid.
Sabotage inside South Africa and guerrilla activity along
the borders by the African National Congress and other
nationalist movements escalates. Civil disobedience, in
the form of boycotts, stay-aways, demonstrations, and
strikes continues to be a feature of the domestic scene.
The government meets these challenges with overwhelming
force. But this coersive potential is selectively utilized
by a government that is careful not to destroy the Black
leadership and Black organizations it needs to implement
its policies and keep the economy functioning.
Vice changing its homeland policy, it is likely that
the government will attempt to make the homelands more
viable and encourage those not already independent to seek
independence. In urban areas, residential segregation will
be continued but the resettlement of surplus Africans,
Indians and Colour eds might not be pressed. In an effort to
co-oot the non-whites economically, the government will
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spend substantial sums to improve Black education, housing
and job skills.
Outside South Africa, the reforms will be treated with
a high degree of skepticsm. The Frontline States will find
themselves under increased pressure by the ANC, PAC and
other nationalist movements to provide bases for guerrilla
efforts. The South African government will use its economic
and military strength to dissuade its neighbors from coopera-
ting with the guerrilla movements. Communist involvement
would vary with the level of tension in the region and with
their ties with the Frontline States. As long as the South
African government demonstrates it can effectively handle
the conventional threat, increased Soviet and Cuban activity
will be limited. African pressure will probably focus on
efforts in the U N, with Western countries arguing that
since reform has started, coersive efforts, such as sanctions,
would be counter productive.
At various stages in this scenario, the government
would presumably try to co-opt the opposition without granting
meaningful political power to non-Whites. Inducements
might include offers of financial aid to the homelands,
greater political recognition for Indians and Coloureds,
government jobs for urban Black leaders, recognition of
Black trade unions and greater authority for township councils
Dramatic guerilla attacks by the ANC would continue to
enhance their image, but as it became clear that the Whites
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were able to suppress the violence, and that the reforms
were raising the standard of living, support could gradually
shift to Black leaders that were able to deliver goods,
not violence.
As internal reform progresses, the racial climate in
South Africa will begin to shift. As the Black leaders
demonstrate a willingness to work within the system, White
fears about political change will become less acute. As
time progresses, the regime will realize that it is in its
best interests to try to negotiate some form of power sharing
with Blacks. White fears will remain strong but will be
offset by their fears of what might happen if they don't
act. It is unlikely that the Whites will take the initiative,
rather Blacks will try to exploit their newly acquired
economic and social power. The pattern will probably
consist of increasingly forceful Black demands met by cautious
and limited White concessions. Eventually, the Whites
would see it in their interests to concede some of their
power, while Blacks would regard it as in their interests
not to demand all of it.
External pressures would continue throughout the negotia^
tions but would abate if substantial political concessions
were made to the South African Blacks. This scenario can




2 . Scenario Two
Scenario Two is essentially the reverse of Scenario
One. The ultra-conservatives (verkramptes) of the National
Party or the new right wing parties gain control of the
government. Their fear is that any alterations in the
fabric of apartheid would make political change inevitable,
thereby destroying Afrikanerdom. A verkrampte government
would return to a more orthodox apartheid policy with
possibly a few cosmetic modifications. Influx control and
resettlement of surplus urban Blacks would be more rigorously
enforced. Black labor unions might continue to be recognized,
but the government would try to limit their effectiveness
by driving a wedge between those affiliated with White
unions and those trying to maintain their independence. Divide
and conquer will be the government's strategy. Townships
might be given limited autonomy but would be kept firmly
under White administrative control. Some economic and
social reforms would be enacted to benefit urban Blacks,
Coloureds, and Indians, but their priority would remain low.
Black response would be as before but would be more bitter
and reflect greater determination. Less concerned with
preserving Black organizations, governmental repression
would be more harsh and sweeping.
The economy, underpinned by sales of gold and other
minerals, would probably remain strong. Despite the absence
of major reforms, Blacks would gain a larger role in the
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economy, both as productive workers and as consumers with
increased buying power. The government would use its power
of patronage to try to co-opt Black moderates. Governmental
success would depend on how divided the Black community
became over ways to achieve their goals. External pressures
would escalate as it became evident that no significant
changes were taking place in South Africa. The ANC and
other Black liberation movements would acquire greater
legitimacy and press for greater support from the Frontline
states. These states, in turn, might be drawn into the
conflict, but at considerable costs to themselves. African
efforts at the United Nations would increase, with probable
emphasis on communications and oil embargoes. Bilateral
pressures might be applied by nations, with key commodities,
like Nigeria. The Soviet Union and Cuba would see an
increased opportunity and respond with increased military
support for the liberation movements. Western nations would
be increasingly restrained by the South African government's
reactionary policies. The Soviet Union would probably
proceed with caution as long as South Africa maintained
its military superiority in the region. The fact that the
South Africa has a nuclear capability would weight in Soviet
calculations
.
The South African government might gain time through
their policies of co-optation, but without any sustained
reform, the polarization of the races would continue.
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Coloureds and Indians would align themselves with the Africans
and the influence of older Blacks over the younger generation
would decline as violence and disruption grew. Labor unrest,
boycotts, demonstrations, and other forms of civil unrest
would begin to undermine the government. White emigration
would increase as individuals' security and livelihoods
became threatened. Slowly over a long period of time, the
country would descend into a bloody civil war involving
massive destruction of life and property. In the end, the
Afrikaner belief in victory would collapse, leading to
partition, a Zimbabwe type of power-sharing arrangement
or possibly a final nuclear act of desperation.
3 . Scenario Three
In Scenario Three the reformist movement of Prime
Minister Botha is able to prevail over the status quo
oriented forces to his right. Black opposition, however,
continues to mount. Sabotage inside South Africa becomes
increasingly more violent and guerrilla activity along the
borders by the African National Congress and other nationalist
movements escalates. Civil disobedience, in the form of
boycotts, stay-aways, demonstrations, and strikes continues
to be a feature of the domestic scene. The government
meets these challenges with overwhelming force. Instead of
smashing Black resistance, the Government's actions increase
Black unity and enhance the perception among Blacks that
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fundamental change will come about only through revolutionary
violence.
Outside South Africa, reforms will be treated with a
high degree of skepticism. The Frontline States will find
themselves under increased pressure by the ANC, PAC and other
nationalist movements to provide bases for guerrilla efforts.
The South African government will use its economic and
military strength to dissuade its neighbors from cooperating
with the guerrilla movements. Communist involvement would
vary with the level of tension in the region and with their
ties with the Frontline States. As long as the South African
government demonstrates it can effectively handle the conven-
tional threat, increased Soviet and Cuban activity will be
limited. African pressure will probably focus on efforts
in the U N, with Western countries condeming the violence on
both sides but arguing that since reform has started,
coersive efforts, such as sanctions, would be counter
productive.
At various stages in this scenario, the government
would presumably try to co-opt the opposition without granting
meaningful political power to non-Whites. Inducements
might include offers of financial aid to the homelands,
greater political recognition for Indians and Coloureds,
government jobs for urban Black leaders, recognition of
Black trade unions and greater authority for township councils
Dramatic guerrilla attacks by the ANC would continue to
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enhance their image, and promote the perception that change
is coming about as a result of their actions
.
Coloureds and Indians would align themselves with
the Africans and the influence of older Blacks over the
younger generation would decline as violence and disruption
grew. Labor unrest, boycotts, demonstrations, and other
forms of civil unrest would begin to undermine the government
White emigration would increase as individuals ' security and
livelihoods became threatened. Slowly over a long period
of time, the country would descend into a bloody civil war
involving massive destruction of life and property. In
the end, the Afrikaner belief in victory would collapse,
leading to partition, a Zimbabwe type of power-sharing
arrangement or possibly a final nuclear act of desperation.
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IV. A STRATEGY FOR U.S. DECISION MAKERS
Political instability and armed conflict are clearly
the greatest direct threats to U.S. interest in the region.
Thus, U.S. policy objectives should be aimed at achieving
Scenario One, a relatively peaceful transition to majority
rule. Since the area is of peripheral importance, the
expenditure of U.S. resources should be kept to a minimum.
A. A CORE STRATEGY
1. Opposition to Apartheid
The basis of any core strategy for the region must
be U.S. opposition to apartheid. This is crucial for several
reasons. First, is the question of legitimacy at home.
The American public is not going to support a foreign policy
that overlooks a system that is the antithesis of our own
way of life. Apartheid is seen as morally wrong by a
majority of Americans. Secondly, demonstrated U.S. opposition
enhances the prospects for achieving scenario one. U.S.
disapproval would be a source of hope for Black South
Africans. That hope combined with our disapproval constitutes
a form of moral pressure on the White regime. As long as
Black and White South Africans retain the capacity to
compromise, moral pressure is likely to increase the chances
that apartheid will be dismantled through a process involving
less rather than more violence. Finally, it would end a
73

myth that the South African government has been trying to
promote. U.S. opposition would clearly demonstrate that
the U.S. does not accept the view that South Africa, under
White minority rule, constitutes a bulwark against communism,
rather, the U.S. sees apartheid as a target of opportunity
for communist inspired instability.
The dilemma confronting U.S. policy makers is how
to demonstrate this opposition without damaging the prospects
for realizing other U.S. interests in the country. After
all, the present regime is firmly in control and the prospects
for near term change are small. Thus, actions designed to
achieve this instrumental goal must be transmitted across
multiple transmission belts, not just the state to state
medium. The United States should pursue the goal of majority
rule through a wide range of pressures and inducements aimed
at influencing the actions of the South African Government.
Actions the United States government could pursue, all
permitted by International Law, are as follows:
1. Publicize the continuing opposition of the U.S.
Government and the American people to the system of apartheid;
send U.S. officials to the funerals of South African Blacks
who die in detention; have embassy staff personnel attend
political trials.
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Robert Bathurst is a leading advocate of this position.
Although his work has centered on US/USSR relations, the




2. Expand contacts with Black South African leaders,
both inside and outside the country.
3. Continue to withold recognition of the "independent"
homelands
.
4. Support humanitarian aid programs for Black South
Africans
.
5. Broaden the arms embargo to include foreign subsidiaries
of U.S. companies, insure "dual use" items are not exported
to S.A.
U.S. corporations should show their support of U.S. policy
by:
1. Enacting a moratorium on new investment.
2. Developing a social development expenditure standard
aimed at bettering the plight of their workers.
3. Adhering to the Sullivan principles.
Continued state to state contact is needed to maximize
the weight and credibility of the United States 1 view.
If all contacts were to be severed, U.S. policy makers would
lose what few "carrots" they have.
2 . Opposition to Nuclear Proliferation
The second issue that should be addressed by the
core strategy is the issue of nuclear proliferation. South
African capabilities suggest efforts in two areas. First,
efforts are needed to bring South African exports of nuclear
technologies and/or materials under international safeguards.
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Second, continued efforts aimed at pursuading South Africa
not to overtly go nuclear.
Actions taken by the U.S. government could include:
1. Governmental talks aimed at obtaining a South African
signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
a. U.S. efforts to get South Africa reinstated on
the IAEA Board of Directors and U.S. supplies of enriched
uranium for SAFARI-1 and the Koeburg power plants could be
used as inducements.
b. Non-public Western pressure on the Botha government
aimed at convincing him that the nuclear option would not
be politically cost effective.
2. Allow South Africa to join the London Group of Suppliers
3. Prevent any technology transfers that would enhance
South African enrichment capabilities.
B. A FORWARD LOOKING STRATEGY
The second aspect of U.S. strategy should be support for
organizations inside South Africa working for change.
Emphasis should be directed toward the development of Black
leadership. Efforts by both the U.S. Government and private
institutions can be instrumental in this area. Areas of
actions to be taken could include:
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1. Support public interest organizations in South Africa
44that are working for change.
2. Encourage antiapartheid activities by private groups. 5
3. Support programs aimed at providing increased education
for South African Blacks; expand Black educational opportunities
in the U.S.
4. Encourage links between U.S. labor unions and multi-
racial unions in South Africa; effective utilization of
economic power would constitute a powerful force for change.
5. Require U.S. corporations to abide by the Sullivan
Principles; encourage the idea that they support Black
economic development through local investments and Ions
.
C. HEDGING STRATEGY
A third aspect of U.S. foreign policy should be to reduce
our vulnerability to stoppages of vital minerals. This can
be accomplished by:
44The Legal Resources Center, a public interest law firm
representing poor Blacks, in August of 1980 won a legal
battle that allowed the families of legal Black workers to
live with them in the urban centers. The Center receives
funds from at least three U.S. foundations.
45South Africa's current racial policy on sports leaves
a great deal of discretion to local teams. Pressure by
U.S. sports associations has had the effect of multiracial
touring teams. Other areas where this kind of peer pressure
could prove effective is professional groups: lawyers;
doctors; military officers, etc.
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1. Instituting a National Minerals Policy.
2. Help develop the infrastructure of Southern Africa; the
4 7Nine represent alternative sources of supply.
3. Increase stockpiles of ferrochrome, ferromanganese,
platinum, and vanadium.
4. Encourage our allies to take similar measures; it lessens
their dependency and it lessens the amount of sources the U.S.
has to expend.
D. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS
The previous sections dealt with policy options that were
clealy mid spectrum. The underlying assumption was that
American foreign policy could play an instrumental role in
South Africa, providing it was properly directed. This chapter
will address two options that are frequently addressed in the
literature and at the UN. The two are at opposite ends of the
spectrum.
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In 1980, Congress passed the National Materials and
Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act. The act
provides for a "continuing long-range analysis of materials
used to meet national security, economic, industrial, and
social needs; the adequacy and stability of supplies; and the
implications of supply disruptions."
47Economic aid to the Nine would also serve our world order
interests. Aid to them would lessen their dependence on South
Africa and the USSR and give the perception of the U.S.
aligning itself with the forces of change. These countries
also represent the key factors that formulate African policy
toward South Africa in the OAU and UN.

The first is the "no policy" policy option. Major
objectives of this policy would be to free the United States
from any responsibility for the ways in which African States
work out their political destiny and to reserve confrontation/
competition with the Soviet Union for global issues of
paramount importance to the West, avoiding petty contests for
leverage in areas of the Third World where our national
interests are marginal.
Advocates of this policy emphasize that nationalism is the
strongest force on the continent; that the expanded presence of
the Soviet Union is a function of its worldwide rivalry with
the U.S. and not part of an ideological crusade; and that
economic rather than ideological considerations will determine
African trade patterns. While there are some elements of truth
in this position, it clearly represents a reckless approach for
the world's most powerful nation to pursue. The U.S. has
legitimate interests in the region and definitely should not
abdicate its leadership position to the Soviets.
The second option is the question of sanctions against
South Africa. Supporters of sanctions argue that sanctions
would have serious economic consequences if they were
effectively imposed. Supporters point out that South Africa is
heavily dependent upon a relatively small number of foreign
suppliers for high technology and investment capital.
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They argue that an effective trade embargo against South Africa
would have a significant impact on industrial growth,
productivity, and unemployment. Economic hardship would lead
to political change, either through white actions designed at
terminating the embargo or through the collapse of the economy
and the creation of a revolutionary situation.
Opponents of sanctions concede that South Africa's
dependence on imports constitutes its greatest vulnerability
but they argue that South Africa would be able to meet most of
its needs through import substitution and conservation. South
African exports, principally gold and unprocessed minerals,
could be marketed with relative ease. This would provide South
Africa with sufficient foreign exchange to purchase commodities
through Black market middle men. Instead of leading to change,
sanctions would unite the White community, strengthen the
reactionary elements and dry up resources that could have been
used to ease the plight of Black South Africans. In short, the
government would ensure that the White community was adequately
cushioned against the economc effects of sanctions, while the
Black population would bear the brunt of its effects.
The Rhodesian experience suggests that the more likely
result of sanctions would be a more defiant and self-
sufficient South Africa. If the current arms embargo is any
indicator, the South Africans will bear the added costs and
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develop their own capabilities vice caving in to outside
pressure.
The strongest case against sanctions can be made over the
question of the costs of imposing them. South Africa's
landlocked neighbors are heavily dependent on South African
ports. It is highly unlikely that the South African
government would allow the shipment of oil or other
commodities to its neighbors while those items were in short
supply at home. Thus, those countries would suffer the
effects of a defacto embargo.
In the West, even if an exception was made for the
purchase of strategic materials, the cost would be
prohibitively high for certain countries. The British
government has made it clear that the political and economic
costs of sanctions are too severe for them to accept. West
Germany, France, and Japan would also suffer losses in export
earnings, and more important, an increase in unemployment at a
time when those governments are under severe domestic pressure
to reduce unemployment.
Without support from all of our Western allies, sanctions
would only result in a realigning of South African trade
patterns. American interests would hardly be served by an
increase in costs for strategic minerals and a loss of trade.
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V. IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGY
A. THE PROBLEM OF ETHNOCENTRISM
Like most important concepts in international relations,
ethnocentrism is more easily defined than recognized or
measured. The characteristic features of ethnocenrism
include: (1) a strong identification with one's own group and
its culture; (2) a tendency to see one's own group as the
center of the universe; (3) a tendency to perceive events in
terms of one's own interests; (4) a tendency to prefer one's
own way of life over all others (seeing it as involving the
best and right ways of acting, with an associated bias against
other groups and their ways of acting): and (5) a general
suspicion of foreigners, their modes of thought, action, and
motives . ^°
The primary impact of ethnocentrism is that it increases
the distortion between the "psychological milieu" (the world
as the decision maker sees it) and the "operational milieu"
(the world in which the policy will be carried out).
To minimize this distortion, the decision maker needs to
transcend his cultural based bias and see events from the
other side's perspective. This does not mean he has to accept
the other side's perspective, only understand how it may




Four questions that should arise when addressing U.S.
policy options toward South Africa demonstrate the importance
of correctly assessing the other side's objectives and
beliefs. First, is the issue negotiable? Second, can the
issue be treated in isolation? Is it highly situation bound,
or is it symptomatic of an even larger issue? Third, how
important is the issue to both sides? Fourth, what threats/
promises will be most effective?
American and South African perspectives of the situation
in Southern Africa vary considerably. These differences
reflect the effects of ethnocentrism on the cognitive
structure of Americans and South Africans alike. To
demonstrate the importance of cultural relativity to the
development and implementation of a strategy, perceptions
dealing with the following areas will be addressed: (a)
apartheid; (b) the communist threat; and (c) South Africa's
efforts at regional stability.
American views of apartheid come from the American
cultural experience with Black Americans. Within the context
of that experience, a bloody civil war was fought and won
by the side that believed that all human beings had the
right to be free and free Blacks would not represent a threat
to the White's way of life. The century long struggle
by Blacks to achieve their political rights has also left
the impression that any system, particularly a system of
minority rule, that denies rights to a large percentage
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of its citizens is inherently unstable. Thus the moral
repulsion Americans feel toward apartheid, and the American
belief that it is unviable represent a mind set that developed
out of our cultural experience.
South African views represent very different cultural
experiences. For the Afrikaner, Blacks represent a threat
that he has been able to effectively deal with for over three
hundred years. Unlike the English, French or Portuguese in
Africa, the Afrikaner turned his back on his European origins.
South Africa became his country, and Blacks were treated in
much the same manner as American Indians. Thus for the ardent
Afrikaner, his cultural experience does not cultivate the
American perceptions of morality or longterm instability.
Apartheid, for the Afrikaner, is a viable option.
English-speaking South Africans did not turn their backs
on their European origins. Western political thought is
evident in the platforms the English speaking parties in
Parliament have adopted. While they agree in principle to
Black participation, many English speakers side with the
Afrikaner out of a fear of what Black rule would bring.
While differences in opinion exist between the White
tribes of South Africa over apartheid, there is a general
agreement over the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The idea




"The onslaught is a result of the expansionist policy
of Soviet Russia and the so-called liberation struggle
in which it joins forces with Black Power organization
and actually exploits Black nationalism for its own
purposes. The fact remains that Soviet Russia has
identified that Republic of South Africa as a target
area. It has done so, not only because it has got its
eye on us, but also because it wants to use us in the
struggle against the West. The rationale lies in the
strategic position and the mineral wealth of the RSA.
Soviet Russia believes that if it can control the supply
of oil from the Middle East and of minerals from South
Africa to the West, it can dominate the West and force
it to surrender. Therefore, the struggle which Soviet
Russia is helping to wage and is increasingly instigating
in Southern Africa is one which has a bearing on its
total onslaught of the West as well.""
Viewed within the context of a "total onslaught"
mentality, Government actions like: suppression of Blacks,
cross border raids into Mozambique and Lesotho, and continued
occupation of Namibia are seen as prudent actions.
While Americans will agree that Soviet/Cuban actions in
Southern Africa are a threat to the present power structure,
the prevailing perception is that South African actions are
increasing the opportunities for Soviet interference. South
African raids into Angola, and Mozambique merely increase the
dependence of those nations on the Soviet Union for arms.
South African support for UNITA and the MRM increases the
likelihood that those nations will accept larger and larger
number of Cuban troops or East German advisors. In short, the
belliferent attitudes of South Africa towards its neighbors
ino ,
49Southern African Facts Sheet , Number 39, September
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has increased Soviet influence by elevating the defense
interest of those nations to the vital level, while economic
interests remain at the major level.
1. Differing Intensity Levels
Another complexity confronting the implementation of
a strategy, is the fact the United States and South Africa
view different issues at different intensity levels.
The issue of apartheid is addressed by the United
States at the major level. U.S. world order interests and
ideological interests are involved with the issue. U.S.
policy is aimed at redressing Black grievances and preventing
a major flare up that could be exploited by the Soviets. For
the South Africans, the issue of Apartheid represents defense
as well as ideological interests. Depending on the level of
tension the intensity could be vital or survival. Any
alterations in the system directly affect the position of the
White minority, thus, what the U.S. considers negotiable may
not be to the South Africans.
2. Rationality
A major impediment to the implementation of any
strategy is the behavior of the extreme elements in a
society. In the case of South Africa, the U.S. is confronted
with two groups that may prove to be major obstacles to any
peaceful resolution.
The first is the ardent right wing of Afrikanerdom,
represented by the Conservative Party of Dr. Andries
86

Treurnicht and the Herstigte Nasionale party. Supporters of
these parties believe that any change in the existing system
will lead to the ultimate destruction of their way of life.
What is needed is a strengthening of the system of apartheid,
not a constitutional reform aimed at easing tensions and
expanding the laager.
This group is difficult to deal with because
incentives designed to promote peaceful changes are
ineffectual. Maintaining the status quo is all that
matters. Economic growth or peaceful relations with Black
Africa would be nice but not at the expense of apartheid.
The second group is Black radicals. They are
especially difficult to deal with because the policy options
available to U.S. decision-makers fall far short of any
position they are likely to accept. As the situation in
South Africa evolves they are potentially dangerous because
their indiscriminant use of violence tends to polarize that
society. For U.S. policy to work, calmer heads in both races
have to prevail.
B. DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES/CONSTRAINTS
The American public has so far shown little interest in
South African affairs. This disinterest has provided both
the President and the Congress a freer hand in policy
decisions. This lack of strong constituencies, though, has
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enabled small special-interests groups to exert decisive
influence on policy formulation. 50
1. An African Constituency
While public interest has been marked by apathy, an
African constituency has been taking shape. Beginning in the
late seventies, a group of White liberal congressmen joined
the Black caucus in an attempt to create a constituency.
They organized a loose coalition of labor, Black, and civil
rights organizations outside of Congress to take positions on
African issues and to generate broader public support for
them. Within Congress, the Black caucus has arranged
seminars to keep members abreast of current African
developments
.
The influence of either group is hard to access
.
Both have taken a strong stand against apartheid and in favor
of foreign aid to the Nine. 5 Without a broad multiracial
base, however, they have not been able to get any of their
own bills passed. Recently they led a successful effort in
the House to block the repeal of the Clark Amendment, which
prohibits U.S. military aid to guerrilla groups in Angola.
In this effort they were joined by the Gulf Oil Lobby and
Two examples of this are the Byrd Amendment,
authorizing U.S. imports of Rhodesian Chrome, and Gulf Oil's
success at preventing the repeal of the Clark amendment.
51
The Nine consist of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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some conservative White southern members who were seeking to
earn points with their Black constituents by voting for Black
Africa interests.
U.S. business concerns with South African investments
are the other identifiable constituency. The small scale of
their investments means that few have a vital corporate stake
in the region, and most could pull out without sustaining
serious losses. "As one executive put it, the ripple in our
profit-and-loss statement would be so small, it could be
5 2explained in one sentence in the annual report." Perhaps
this is the reason that U.S. businesses have not formed a
strong, permanent lobby to represent their views . When
threatened, they have worked throughout the Commerce
Department to have their views heard.
2. U.S. Public Opinion Polls
Recent public opinion polls suggest the outer
5 "3boundaries of a Southern African policy. Both polls
revealed almost no support for apartheid. Western pressure
aimed at greater freedom for Blacks was strongly favored, but
sanctions or military force against South Africa were
strongly opposed. Less than 3 percent favored an American
52 .Robert S. Jaster, Southern Africa in Conflict , American
Enterprise Institute, 1982, p. 31.
53 Discussion will be based on two polls: Carneigie
Endowment for International Peace, Public Opinion Poll on
American Attitudes Toward South Africa , 1979, William J.
Foltz, Elite Opinion on United States Policy Toward Africa ,
Council on Foreign Relations, 1979.
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military option to halt the spread of Soviet and Cuban
influence. The Foltz poll noted that nearly 25 percent of
the American public had no opinion on African issues, and 10
percent were badly confused. This suggests that the American




VI. THE NUCLEAR SOUTH AFRICA
On 20 July, 1977, the Soviets launched a manueverable
satellite equipped with high resolution photographic
equipment. The mission of Cosmos 932 was to photograph a
tower and blocklike structures located by a previous
reconnaissance satellite in the Kalahari Desert of South
54
Africa. On August 6, four days after the satellite was
recovered, Soviet diplomats delivered an urgent personal
message from Brezhnev to President Carter requesting Carter's
help in heading off a South African nuclear test.
Despite South African claims that the charges were
trumped-up by the Soviets to coincide with a United Nations
conference on apartheid, U.S. officials concurred with Soviet
intelligence estimates. Clear, detailed U.S. reconnaissance
photographs revealed construction that was typical of a
nuclear test site.
During the two weeks that followed, the two superpowers
joined by Great Britain, France and West Germany launched a
concerted diplomatic effort to convince South Africa that
any potential benefits she might gain by overtly testing
54
Dr. Frank Barnaby, "Nuclear South Africa", New
Scientist , 19 October 1978.
Murray Marder and Don Oberdorfer, "How West, Soviets
Acted to Defuse S. African A-Test", The Washington Post ,
28 August 1977, p. 1.
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a nuclear device would be far outweighed by the negative
ramifications of going nuclear.
The test site detected in the Kalahari Desert has never
been used, but a "mysterious" flash in the night sky of 22
September 1979 suggested that the diplomatic pressure only
succeeded in convincing the South African leadership that any
future test would have to be conducted in a covert manner.
To support the position that the flash represented a near
perfect nuclear test by South Africa, the following areas
will be addressed in this paper: (1) Afrikaner threat
perceptions; (2) South African nuclear capabilities; (3) the
mysterious flash; and (4) the case for strategic deception.
A. AFRIKANER THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Many Western analysts have discounted the likelihood of
South Africa going nuclear because of a belief that nuclear
weapons would not significantly increase South Africa's
security. They point out that nuclear weapons would be of
little utility against the two most likely forms of Black
resistance: guerrilla insurgency and Black urban unrest.
However, a South African decision to acquire nuclear weapons
would be based on South African threat perceptions and not
Western perceptions of the threat to South Africa. White
South Africans view the world differently and their
perceptions yield different conclusions.
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The White South African view is that the republic stands
alone in confronting a communist inspired "total onslaught".
General Magnus Malan, South Africa's Minister of Defense, has
defined the onslaught as follows:
"The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated
struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional
imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state.
The aim is therefore also total, not only in terms of
the ideology, but also regards the political, social,
economic and technological ." 56
To counter this onslaught, the government has devised a
"Total National Strategy" (TNS) aimed at mobilizing the
republic's resources. The 1977, South African White Paper on
Defense defined the TNS as a
"Comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available
to a state to achieve the national aims within the frame-
work of the specific policies. A total national strategy
is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but
is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the
state structure ." 57
A further articulation of this strategy is Prime Minister
P. W. Botha's address to the National Party Congress in
Durban on 15 August 1979. The address centered on a 12-point
plan aimed at withstanding the onslaught. Botha's ninth
point addressed the determination of South Africa to
withstand external interference.
Geldenhuys, p. 3.
White Paper on Defense, 1977, p. 5
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"In the ninth place, South Africa's firm determina-
tion to defend itself against interference from
outside in every possible way. And allow me to say
here tonight, not boastfully but we are better able
to defend South Africa militarily than ever before in
the country's history. And I want to warn those who
think that we practise our politics from a position
of weakness: we are not speaking from a position of
weakness, we are speaking from a position of decency.
If they want to test us, our strength, we will hit
back for the sake of South Africa's self-respect."
Recent opinion polls of White South Africans show that
they not only share the governments view of the threat but
support a firm response to that threat. When asked to
respond to the statement, "The communist threat against the
country is exaggerated by the government", only 5.2%
CO
definitely agreed while 79.9% disagreed. In response to
the statement, "South Africa should militarily attack
terrorists bases in neighboring states, 81.8% agreed and only
593.4% definitely disagreed. Support for a strong, forceful
governmental approach transcends traditional political
divisions. In short, any government that is perceived by
the electorate to be soft, would find its days in office




58Deon Geldenhuys, What do We Think: A Survey of White
Opinion on Foreign Policy Issues , Braanfontein: South
African Institute of International Affairs, 1982, p. 6.
59
IBID, p. 10.
60Opposition MP H. H. Schwarz of the PFP expressed
support for the government's position this way during a House
of Assembly Debate on March 2, 1979: "...in Africa as things
stand we are not going to have to deal with a purely African
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"I know my own people", said the editor of one of the
country's leading newspapers, himself an Afrikaner.
"After the Great Trek and the Boer War, the Afrikaner
resolved that they would never again allow themselves
to be dispossessed. Whatever the cost, they'd see to
it that they have the means to repel any new challenge.
Believe me, if they had the chance to acquire the
ultimate weapon, they'd grab it." 61
While the onslaught is seen as multidimensional, the
military threat is considered to be the most serious threat
to the Republic. The importance the South Africans attach to
this threat and the impetus it provides in defense planning
has largely been ignored by Western analysts. It is here
that the rationale for nuclear weapons lies. The prospect of
a large scale, communist supported, conventional assault on
the Republic is seen as a real possibility by South African
defense planners. Small yield tactical nuclear weapons would
be useful against massed conventional forces. Even if not
employed, the threat of their use would force the enemy to
disperse, thereby reducing his effectiveness in the
conventional realm.
Skeptics of this position are sure to argue that South
Africa can mobilize nearly 800,000 highly trained, highly
situation. . .we must unfortunately expect to see more foreign
troops on our borders. We already have the Cubans; now
something else has been added: a second Africa Corps...
composed of East Germans .. .highly trained and experienced...
equipped with the most modern weapons."
6
1
John Burns, "South Africa's Secret Atom Plant Suspected
of Working on a Bomb", New York Times, 3 May 1977, p. 6.
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motivated men in the face of any conventional attack. The
notion that the South African Defense Force (SADF) would feel
that it needed nuclear weapons is absurd, given the dispari-
ties in conventional firepower between South Africa and the
rest of Southern Africa. The spectre of a Soviet supported
conventional attack, while the West stands on the sidelines,
is apparently what drives South African defense planning.
Given this perception, the only prudent position would be a
South African "force de grappe" aimed at convincing the
Soviets that the costs of a large scale conventional attack
by Soviet proxies would prove to far outweigh the potential
political gains. This type of force would be tactical to the
Soviets, strategic for the South Africans.
B. SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
The South African nuclear program can be divided into
four distinct stages. Stage one began during the late 1940'
s
and centered on the production of uranium ore. In an effort
to ensure adequate uranium supplies for their nuclear
programs, the United States and Great Britain established
facilities in South Africa for the extraction of uranium ore.
These facilities were placed under Pretoria's control, and
the flow of American and British technical information
regarding ore extraction fostered scientific discussions of
62
nuclear matters among the three nations.
Kenneth L. Adelman and Albion W. Knight, "Can South
Africa Go Nuclear", ORBIS, Fall 1979, p. 634.
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The Atoms for Peace Program, established by President
Eisenhower, initiated stage two. Under the terms of a
twenty-year agreement signed in 1957, ninety-four South
African nuclear scientists and engineers received training at
* ., . . . . 63facilities in this country. The agreement also authorized
the sale and fueling of a U.S. designed research reactor
SAFARI- 1. In 1977 the agreement was amended to extend the
expiration date until the year 2007. All enriched (weapons
grade) uranium provided for SAFARI-1 was under International
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the spent fuel has been
returned to the U.S.
In 1964 the research reactor SAFARI-1 at Pelindaba became
operational. Since then South African nuclear physicists
have had the capability to conduct two types of nuclear
experiments that are crucial to the development of a clean
tactical nuclear weapon. The first category of research,
commonly referred to as neutronics, deals with neutron
activation analysis. The second broad category deals with
the properties of certain types of material under the
6 4bombardment of neutrons.
6 3
Adelman, p. 635. In addition to the initial training
provided by the United States, South Africa has four
universities with significant nuclear related programs: the
University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg; Cape Town
University; Stellonsbosch University, and the University of
Pretoria. Other sources of training and advanced technology
include contacts with Great Britain, France, West Germany,
Taiwan, and Israel.
64Quentin Peel, "Pretoria Nuclear Research Hit by U.S.
Fuel Embargo", Financial Times , July 5, 1979.
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Utilizing the technology acquired from SAFARI-I, South
Africa designed and built a second research reactor,
65
Pelunduna Zero. This reactor went critical in 1967 and is
not subject to any international safeguards.
Stages 1 and 2 provided South Africa with the raw
materials and the technological base necessary for stage
three, an independent enrichment capability. On July 20,
1970, Prime Minister Vorster announced to Parliament that
South African nuclear scientists had developed a new and
unique process that would enrich fuel at a much lower cost
than existing technologies. Parliament responded by
authorizing the construction of a pilot enrichment plant at
Valindaba (Zulu for the talking is over) . The pilot plant
became operational in 1975 and since then its operation has
been a state secret. U.S. intelligence sources estimate that
Valindaba could have produced as much as 40 kgs of weapons
grade uranium by 1979.
Stage four represents the "peaceful" application of a
nuclear power program. In 1976, construction of two nuclear
plants at Koeburg South Africa began. Designed and built by
a French consortium, the plants are due to become operational
in the mid 1980' s and provide roughly 10% of South Africa's
6 5
Richard Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa?",
International Security , Fall 1979, p. 92
66N.Y. Times, May 3, 1977.
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electrical needs. Each plant will have a 1000 MW capacity
and as a by-product produce 200 kg of plutonium a year;
roughly enough plutonium for 26 bombs per year per plant.67
In summation, South Africa has: (1) a sufficient
scientific and industrial base from which to conduct a
nuclear weapons R&D Program; (2) access to technology
needed for nuclear weapons development; (3) an indigenous
source of enriched uranium; and (4) a tightly controlled,
efficient agency capable of managing a covert nuclear weapons
production program. 6 °
C. THE MYSTERIOUS FLASH
U.S. efforts to detect nuclear explosions are geared
toward certain characteristic phenomena. Satellites, like
the Vela series, are designed to measure the electromagnetic
energy produced by the explosion, while seismic and acoustic
gear measure the effects of blast/shock waves." Residual
radioactive fallout can be collected, providing the area of
the test can be pinpointed and it is accessible to U.S.
collection platforms.
Any nation attempting to conduct a covert test would
presumably try to prevent another nation from detecting these
phenomena. The most obvious factor would be the choice
Barnaby, p. 2.
Aldermann, p. 6 39.
69




of the test site. A remote, relatively unmonitored corner of
the world, such as the region between South Africa and
Antartica would be optimum. In addition to the location of
the test, the size of yield, the type of burst and the
weather conditions at the time of the test would be crucial
to efforts at avoiding detection. A small yield air burst
conducted at sea under a heavy cloud cover would not only
minimize the chances of detection but also would severely
hamper efforts to confirm a suspected test.
On September 22, 1979, a Vela satellite detected the
unique double pulse signature of a small scaled nuclear
explosion off the coast of South Africa. Although the
satellite was equiped to sense radiation and other electro-
magnetic disturbances associated with a nuclear blast, these
sensors were either turned off at the crucial moment or were
. . . 71
not sensitive enough to register what happened. The
satellite's optical sensors had been calibrated for accuracy
a week before the sighting and immediately afterward.
72Neither calibration revealed any malfunction. Defense
officials stated that this was the 42nd time a Vela satellite
For an in-depth source on nuclear effects, see Samuel
Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, ed, The Effects of Nuclear
Weapons, 3rd Edition , U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington D.C., 1977.
71
"Flash Not Missed by Vela Still Veiled in Mist",





had registered a double pulse and in the first 41 occurrences
the double pulse had been correlated with a known nuclear
73
test.
Technical experts, analyzing the intensity of light
detected by Vela, calculated the size of the explosion to be
two to three kilotons. 4 Efforts to pinpoint the area of the
blast, however, proved to be less precise. Since only one
Vela satellite was in a position to detect the explosion, the
area of probability was 4,500 square miles. If two or more
had detected the blast, the area could have been pinpointed
7 Sto within a couple of square miles.
Another observation made by chance a few hours later at
the radio observatory at Arecibo, Puerto Rico, suggested that
7 fithe Vela satellite had indeed seen a nuclear test.
Scientists were watching the upper atmosphere in an effort to
gather baseline data for another experiment. According to
scientists who made the observation, a pattern of ducted
ionospheric disturbances were observed arriving from the
southeast, at a suitable time interval to allow them to have
73 IBID.
74Richard Burt, "Burst of Light Led to Speculation South




"Scientists Fail to Solve Vela Mystery", Science , vol.
207, 1 February 1980, p. 504.
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originated in the vicinity of South Africa at the time of the
77Vela sighting. This phenomenon can be generated by a
nuclear explosion sending a shower of beta particles through
the ionosphere causing it to oscillate up and down.
The strongest collaborating piece of evidence, however,
78came from the Naval Research Laboratory. Dr. Alan Berman,
Director of Research for the lab, stated that a hydroacoustic
signal was received from the right direction and at the right
time to correlate it with the Vela sighting. After
receiving the signal, the NRL searched the log for the
previous 30 days and monitored for 30 days after the signal
79to see if there were any comparable signals; there were none.
Dr. Berman stated that the signal was comparable in its
"signature" to those that followed recent overt nuclear tests
in the Pacific. 80
During the debate that followed, technical experts from
Los Alamos, NRL and the DIA argued that the United States had
been lucky to detect the test at all. The Vela satellite had
been at the right place, at the right time, to detect the
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Panel, concluded that since the U.S. had been unable to
collect any radioactive debris, the satellite's sighting was
probably the result of some yet undetermined natural
phenomenon.
To date this undetermined natural phenomenon has defied
definition, while a careful analysis of the technical data
collected is consistent with the thesis that a small nuclear
test was conducted on 22 September 1979. The basis for this
analysis will be the answer to the question, what types of
evidence would one expect to find following a small yield,
8 i
air burst, test.
In an air burst, an estimated 35 to 45 percent of the
8 2
total energy yield is emitted as thermal energy. This
energy is divided into two pulses, an initial pulse, lasting
a fraction of a second, possessing 1% of the total thermal
radiation energy, and a second pulse, lasting for seconds,
8 3possessing 99% of the total thermal energy. This double
pulse phenomena is what the Vela satellite detected. The
81Nuclear effects of a 3 kiloton air blast include the
following: (1) size of fireball, 530 feet across; (2) lines
of sight for a 10,000 foot explosion, 200nm; (3) initial
nuclear radiation, 1000 rems at 1,200 yds reducing to 2 rems
(amount of a chest x-ray) at 6,600 yds; (4) blast effects, 1
psi (crack windows) at 3nm reducing to .1 psi at 5 nm.
82Glasstone, p. 7.




designers of the Vela satellite argue that the uniqueness of
the double pulse rules out the possibility of a natural
84
cause.
As much as 50 percent of the energy an air burst is
8 5transmitted to the environment in the form of a shock wave.
This shock wave could be felt within the immediate area, but
would antenuate greatly with distance from the blast. One
possible method of detecting the effects of the shock wave
would be through the use of a sensitive acoustic system. The
giant acoustic system designed and operated by the U.S. to
detect atmospheric tests was inoperative on the morning of 22
86
September. Another method could be a hydroacoustic system
that was sensitive enough to pick up the shock wave energy
that coupled to the ocean below the blast, causing a
hydroacoustic signal. This is what NRL states it detected
87
with its gear.
A third phenomenon associated with a nuclear explosion is
initial nuclear radiation. This phenomenon takes the form of
high energy electromagnetic radiations. One known
Burt, p. A5
.
35 lasstone, p. 7.
Washington Post , 3 November 1979.
87When the incident blast wave from an explosion in air
strikes a more dense medium such as the ocean, most of its
energy is reflected. The reason that no seismic indications
were received is due to the small yield and the fact that
energy was reflected twice before being coupled to the earth
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effect of this phenomenon is the ionospheric disturbance
noted at Arecibo.
As to the fourth and undetected phenomenon, radioactive
fallout, it has been noted by both defense and administration
officials that efforts to collect debris following
8 8
acknowledged Chinese and French tests also failed. In
South Africa case several factors combined to hamper
collection efforts. First, the test was conducted in a
remote corner of the world. Because of the distances
involved it took time to get collection platforms on station.
Once there, the high altitude reconnaissance planes had to
search large expanses of open ocean. Second, depending on
the height of burst, a small yield blast would not have had
sufficient energy to boost the radioactive debris into the
troposphere. Third, weather conditions (rain) in the area
would have washed the majority of the radioactive debris into
the ocean within 24 hours. Forty-eight hours after the blast
the level of residual radioactivity would have been less than
89
1% of the 1 hour reading.
In addition to the intelligence data surveyed, two pieces
of circumstantial evidence suggest that the South Africans
88
Walter Mussberg, "Mystery Explosion off South Africa
Stills Fuels Dispute", Wall Street Journal , November 14,
1977, p. 1/19.
89Glasstone, p. 19, Reports of fallout in New Zealand
rainwater samples received widespread coverage in November




had at least considered the option of conducting a covert
test. First, a South African naval attache assigned to
Washington requested that the National Technical Information
Service conduct a search of the literature on the detection
90
of seismic evidence. Second, in April 1980, it was
reported that an Oxford trained scientist, Dr. Renfrew
Christie, had been detained since October 1979 under South
Africa's Terrorism Act. His alledged crime was an attempt to
pass information dealing with places which the South African
Atomic Energy Board considered safe for detonating a nuclear
device
.
Two additional pieces of information point to a South
African test on 22 September. The first is the fact that a
South African naval exercise was conducted in the same area
and at the same time as the blast. These naval units failed
to report any unusual sightings. The second is the official
South African response to the blast. Instead of a denial,
the government hedged its position for several days. Foreign
Minister R. F. Botha responded to questions this way: "The
whole event is enveloped in mystery. Should one not first
establish if such an event took place, then endeavor to trace
9 2the origin?" After a suitable delay, possibly designed
90
Betts, p. 303.
91The Telegraph , London, April 14, 1980.
92John Burns, "South African Calls Report of Nuclear
Test 'Nonsense'", N.Y. Times , October 27, 1979, p. A5.
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to see if the United States would be able to prove anything,
strong denials were made.
D. A CASE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION?
The point at which the South African leadership first
considered the nuclear option is difficult, if not impossible
to ascertain. What is clear, is that South Africa is not yet
willing to blatantly disregard Western views on the subject.
Their official policy remains one of calculated ambiguity.
The reasons for this ambiguity are several. First, any
overt decision to exercise the nuclear option would alienate
what little Western support Pretoria still has and invite the
diplomatic and economic retaliation threatened in 1977.
Second, a demonstrated nuclear capability and would enhance
the threat perceptions of South Africa's neighbors, possibly
resulting in an even greater reliance by them on the Soviet
Union. Third, by maintaining the diplomatic equivalent of a
"bomb in the basement", Pretoria is in a position to exchange
nonproliferation for passive Western acceptance of the status
quo. The implied threat being that if the external pressure
significantly increases, the South Africans would be forced
into a nuclear laager.
1 . A Vertically Integrated Industry
While the official South African line has been that
South Africa's nuclear program is geared only toward the
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peaceful pursuits of nuclear energy, a careful analysis of
the path the South African government chose to pursue
suggests a different motivation. From the mid-1960' 3 on, the
Afrikaner leadership either intended to develop a nuclear
capability or spent considerable sums of scarce capital to
keep that option open.
Section three of this chapter traced the development of
the vertically integrated South African nuclear industry.
During the 1950' s, the major emphasis was on uranium ore
production. The development of South Africa's uranium mining
industry provided South Africa with foreign exchange earnings
and the necessary technology to process their uranium
deposits
.
Level two, peaceful research, was largely a product of
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program. SAFARI-I at
Pelindaba has been subject to safeguards from the moment it
became operational in 1964. Research conducted with this
reactor has included isotope research for medical purposes,
food preservation by irradiation, neutron activation
analysis, and fundamental materials testing. All clearly
have peaceful applications and reinforce the image of a
peace-oriented program.
Level two, however, did not stop with one research
reactor. SAFARI-2, a research reactor built indigenously
with the technology gained from SAFARI-I , became operational
in 1967. This research reactor is not subject to
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international safeguards and access to its operation is a
state secret. Why did South Africa spend considerable sums
of scarce capital duplicating an existing capability, unless
she wanted to conduct research beyond the watchful eye of
international inspections. Neutron activation and materials
testings are fundamental prerequisities for clean weapons
design techniques.
The official South African position on level three,
enrichment of uranium, is that they want to be able to refine
their minerals to the highest level possible prior to export.
The economic rationale behind this position is valid when
applied to the refining of ore into ferrochrome or
ferromanganese. The reduction in transportation costs, due
to the lighter weight of the processed ore, provides South
Africa with a comparative advantage over Western processors
of ore. When applied to uranium, the rationale falters.
There is no appreciable savings in transportation costs.
Uranium ore enriched to 3 percent U235 is not any lighter
than natural uranium ore. Additionally, the technology
involved with processing ferrochrome is proven and relatively
inexpensive, while the development of a new uranium
enrichment technology is highly speculative and very
expensive. Recent events have provided the South African
government with another rationale for an indigenous
enrichment capability. South Africa needs the capability to
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provide its own reactors with uranium fuel, highly enriched
uranium for the research reactors and 3 percent U23 5 for the
Koeberg nuclear power stations
.
The relationship between the South African decisions
to pursue an enrichment capability, build light water
reactors and not to sign the NPT is worth examining. Had
South Africa's nuclear strategy totally rejected the nuclear
explosives, two alternative courses of action would seem
reasonable. First and most obvious, sign the NPT and agree
that in exchange for nuclear technology and enriched uranium
supplies, South Africa will forgo the nuclear option. This
course of action would immediately solve their existing fuel
problems for Koeberg and Pelindaba. The second course of
action would have been to build an integrated nuclear
industry that bypassed the enrichment level. Both of South
Africa's peaceful objectives, nuclear research and nuclear
power, could have been achieved at considerable less cost by
not building SAFARI-2 and Valindaba, and by opting for heavy
water reactors which burn natural (unenriched) uranium.
2. The Case for Strategic Deception
If the technical assessments of the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Energy are correct,
the events of 22 September represented a unique first test.
The blast was estimated at two to three kilotons vice twenty
and the blast was an atmospheric blast, meaning an end
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9 3line weapon was used. These two factors required advanced
technology that was not thought to be available to South
Africa. Subsequent efforts to confirm the test by collection
radioactive samples prove fruitless, largely because the
exact location of the blast was not known and the advanced
technology that allows a small yield results in a relatively
clean weapon.
The rationale for testing a nuclear device lies in
the adage that an untested weapon is an unreliable weapon.
This is especially true given the highly sophisticated nature
of nuclear weapons. The reasons why the South African
government would resort to a covert test are even more
obvious. The Western powers were very explicit in August
1977. If the South African government went ahead and tested
a nuclear device, all nuclear cooperation between the
countries would be cancelled. This included nuclear
technology transfers, weapons grade uranium for SAFARI -1,
uranium fuel for the Koeberg plants and any efforts to
reinstate South Africa on the IAEC.
In the book, Strategic Military Deception , Herbig and
Daniel define two types of strategic deception. A-type or
ambiguity increasing is the type employed by South Africa.
Between 1977 and 1979 the South African government attempted
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to increase the uncertainties confronting superpower attempts
to determine the intentions of their nuclear program. Four
factors are important to the success of a deception plan and
will be addressed here.
First, in order to carry out the plan, a certain
amount of secrecy, organization, and coordination is
required. Decisions in South Africa are made at the top by
either the Prime Minister or the Prime Minister and his
cabinet. Thus, the number of individuals involved could have
been restricted to the Prime Minister, a few members of his
cabinet and the scientists at Valindaba. Project secrecy and
organization would have merely merged with the tight security
measures in effect for the South African nuclear program in
general
.
The second factor is the plausibiity of lies and the
credibility of cover stories. From the inspection of their
nuclear power program, the official South African line has
been that South Africa's nuclear program is geared only
toward peaceful pursuits of nuclear energy. Even the
enrichment plant at Valindaba has the credible cover story of
providing uranium enrichment to 3 percent U235 for nuclear
power plants.
Factor three, the use of target predispositions,
represents an area of crucial South African efforts. In the
aftermath of August 1977, the South African government
embarked on an effort aimed at allaying any suspicions of
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South Africa going nuclear and advancing the position that
South Africa lacked the enriching capability necessary for
bomb production. Their objectives were twofold. First, they
would reduce the level of surveillance in the area by
reducing tensions over nuclear issues and secondly they would
foster the image that there were technical reasons why they
could not produce a bomb.
Efforts to achieve the first objective, reducing
surveillance by allaying suspicions, were made easier by the
orientation fo the Carter Administration. In July 1977, the
State Department non-proliferation Czar, Joseph Nye, told
Congress that it was "essential to bring South African
capabilities and motivations within the international
safeguard system and the regime of the NPT . Whatever policy
choices we make, we most focus our vital interests in keeping
94
Africa free of nuclear weapons." President Carter in a
news conference statement August 22, 1977 stated that the
U.S. would renew its efforts to "encourage South Africa to
place all their nuclear power production capabilities under
international safeguards and inspections and encourage them
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to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
South Africa in August 1977 entered into negotiations
to sign the NPT. Their initial demands called for highly





low grade fuel for their Koeberg nuclear power plants, U.S.
efforts to get South Africa reinstated on the IAEC, and
American export permits for non-sensitive technology for
96
South Africa's enrichment plant. After two years the
negotiations floundered because the South Africans claimed
that international inspections of uranium ore extraction
would breach South African security measures on gold mining
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and compromise their unique enrichment process.
Dr. Ampire Roux, Chairman of the South African Atomic
Energy Board, was a key figure in advancing the position that
South Africa was only interested in peaceful applications of
nuclear energy and certain technical deficiencies existed
that would have to be overcome before South Africa could
build a bomb. "Our entire program", Roux stated, "is devoted
to peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Whether that
will change .depends on the government and I cannot forsee
q o
that they will ever change their mind." Roux frequently
repeated a theme that was prevalent in the Western press;
atomic weapons would be of little use for South Africa in
99
controlling guerrilla warfare or urban unrest.
Jaster, p. 46.
97Uranium ore mining in South Africa is largely a
by-product of gold production.
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"S.A. Can Stand on its Own Nuclear Feet", South African





In May 1977, Roux acknowledged that the pilot plant
at Valindaba could be used to produce weapons grade uranium,
but actually producing the raw materials for bombs would
require a "much bigger" plant that even the planned
commercial facility scheduled for 1986. This statement
reinforced Western perceptions concerning the level of South
Africa's technology. Previous initial first tests required
approximately 48 kgs of highly enriched uranium to achieve a
supercritical mass. Intelligence estimates placed the output
by 1979 of Valindaba at possibly 40 kgs. However, if the
same scientific community that achieved a breakthrough in
enrichment technology had merely duplicated Western warhead
design techniques, less than 26 kgs of nuclear material would
have been required. Valindaba' s output would have been more
.- ... • 100than sufficient.
The final factor is strategic initiative or the
element of surprise. By September 1979, the South Africans
had been successful at allaying the fears of an impending
test. Decision-makers in the West were convinced that the
South Africans would not test because the costs far
outweighed the benefits. As a result, intelligence collecting
In a clean device, advanced design techniques are used
to: (a) reduce to a minimum the amount of fissionable
material required, and (b) contain within the device the
neutrons generated, thereby minimizing the amount of
environmental material exposed to those neutrons and
becoming radioactive. John W. Cane, "The Technology of
Modern Weapons for Limited Use", ORBIS , Spring, 1978, p. 221.
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efforts in that remote part of the world were at a minimum.
On the 23rd of September it was too late to step up
surveillance efforts.
E. THE POLITICS OF PROLIFERATION
The opposition of the United States to nuclear
proliferation dates back to the period just after World War
II, when the U.S. called for the internationalization of
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The Baruch plan was not
adopted and the spread of nuclear weapons began. By May 18,
1974, six nations had exploded nuclear devices.
The American position on the proliferation of nuclear
weapons is motivated by a belief that the spread of nuclear
weapons enhances international instability and increases the
likelihood of nuclear war. In the case of South Africa, an
additional fear is present; the potential for terrorists
groups to seize nuclear materials and/or nuclear weapons
during a period of civil war.
The findings by the President's Panel on the blast that a
nuclear test could not be substantiated led to a rebuff by
parts of the technical community. Their position was that
political considerations had forced the Administration to
overlook the uncomfortable facts. South Africa had indeed
tested a nuclear weapon, and the Administration for political
reasons had decided not to press the issue.
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Another, less critical view, is that the Administration
may have been motivated by two additional considerations.
Instead of publicly confirming the test, the decision was
made to allow the South Africans a case for plausible denial.
By adopting this strategy, the Carter Administration was in a
position to privately apply pressure if it was determined
that the South Africans were creating a nuclear arsenal. The
stiffening of Afrikaner resolve and the rhetoric observed
following the public pressure in 1977, could be prevented.
Even more important, a position of plausible denial would
allow the South Africans the option of privately renouncing





While it is true that South Africa is not of vital
importance to the United States, all the ingredients for a
major crisis are present. The dangers of political
instability, large-scale racial conflict, and the growth of
Soviet influence are real. The initiative presently lies
with the White regime in South Africa. Pretoria has the
power to diffuse these dangers by adopting policies that lead
to constructive reform or she can reject that course and try
to reinforce the status quo. U.S. foreign policy must take
into account the Afrikaner's reluctance to surrender any of
their power, for fear of being swamped by their Black
majority.
To deplore or condemn Afrikaner stubbornness will not
change attitudes. Only when they see change as a workable
alternative to a more frightening fate may they adopt a more
pragmatic position on power sharing. The challenge for U.S.
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